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(MIS)CONCEPTIONS OF THE CORPORATION 
Reza Dibadj* 
ABSTRACT 
Common conceptions of the corporation are wrong. Contrary to 
contemporary jurisprudence, a corporation—a piece of paper that is 
given legal legitimacy by a state—is not a person worthy of 
constitutional rights. A corporation, as a legislative creature, should 
only enjoy those rights bestowed upon it by its creator. 
This Article is structured into three principal sections. Part I argues 
that the only appropriate theoretical construct with which to 
conceptualize a corporation is one that posits that the corporation is 
an artificial creation of the state. First, it outlines three competing 
theories—artificial, associational, and real entity—as well as the 
apparently increasingly popular notion that theory simply does not 
matter. It argues that as Supreme Court precedent evolved, it became 
sadly muddled and that today the Court has essentially given up on 
theorizing the corporation. Second, it argues for the artificial entity 
theory on the bases of common sense, constitutional history, and the 
continuing role of the state in chartering corporations. 
Why has the artificial entity theory fallen deeply out of favor? Part 
II, which explores the political economy of corporate theory, argues 
that instrumental reasons explain the decline of artificial entity 
theory: anti-regulatory fervor and a desire to privilege a managerial 
class. Next, it addresses some concerns that might emerge to my 
conceptualization; notably, that not offering constitutional rights to 
corporations is too stark and reductionist an approach, as well as the 
notion that such a restrictive conception of corporate personhood 
might jeopardize attempts to find corporations liable under criminal 
or international law. 
Finally, Part III discusses whether the law has been headed in 
precisely the wrong direction: rather than asking whether 
                                                                                                                 
 *  Professor of Law, University of San Francisco. 
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corporations deserve constitutional rights, should the real question be 
whether constitutional rights should be asserted against corporations? 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 733 
I. TOWARD A THEORY OF THE CORPORATION ................................... 735 
A. Competing Conceptions ....................................................... 735 
B. Coherence Of Artificial Entity Theory ................................. 750 
II. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORPORATE THEORY ............................ 758 
A. Decline Of Artificial Entity Theory ...................................... 759 
B. Some Misplaced Concerns ................................................... 765 






Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol29/iss3/1
2013] (MIS)CONCEPTIONS OF THE CORPORATION 733 
The emperor marched in the procession under the beautiful 
canopy, and all who saw him in the street and out of the 
windows exclaimed: “Indeed, the emperor’s new suit is 
incomparable! What a long train he has! How well it fits him!” 
Nobody wished to let others know he saw nothing, for then he 
would have been unfit for his office or too stupid. Never 
emperor’s clothes were more admired. “But he has nothing on at 
all,” said a little child at last.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Common conceptions of the corporation are wrong. Contrary to 
contemporary jurisprudence, a corporation—a piece of paper that is 
given legal legitimacy by a state—is not a person worthy of 
constitutional rights. On the one hand, this argument may appear so 
banal that it seems absurd to devote an entire law review article to it; 
on the other, no matter how simple and intuitive this point of view 
might be, I am fighting a discouraging uphill battle. The opposing 
point of view—namely, that corporations are worthy of constitutional 
protection—is so entrenched that all I can do is expose its fallacies 
and offer a small hope for future reform. 
In an area of law that has become unnecessarily muddled, I argue 
for simplicity and intellectual consistency.2 My thesis is simple: a 
corporation, as a legislative creature, should only enjoy those rights 
bestowed upon it by its creator. 
The argument is structured into three principal sections. Part I 
argues that the only appropriate theoretical construct for 
conceptualizing a corporation is one that posits that the corporation is 
an artificial creation of the state.3 First, it outlines three competing 
theories—artificial, associational, and real entity—as well as the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Hans Christian Andersen, The Emperor’s New Suit, HCA.GILEAD.ORG.IL (Dec. 13, 2007, 8:45 
PM), http://hca.gilead.org.il/emperor.html. 
 2. Cf. Note, What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1747 (2001) [hereinafter Legal Fiction] (lamenting “the theoretical unmooring 
and doctrinal disarray of the American law of persons”). 
 3. See discussion infra Part I. 
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apparently increasingly popular notion that theory simply does not 
matter.4 It argues that as Supreme Court precedent evolved, it became 
sadly muddled and that today the Court has essentially given up on 
theorizing the corporation.5 Second, it argues for the artificial entity 
theory on the bases of common sense, constitutional history, and the 
continuing role of the state in chartering corporations.6 
Part II delves into the political economy of corporate theory. If, as 
Part I argues, the artificial theory makes so much sense, then why has 
it fallen deeply out of favor? Part II argues that instrumental reasons 
explain the decline of artificial entity theory: anti-regulatory fervor 
and a desire to privilege a managerial class. Next, I address some 
concerns that might emerge from my conceptualization: notably, that 
not offering constitutional rights to corporations is too stark and 
reductionist an approach as well as the notion that such a restrictive 
conception of corporate personhood might jeopardize attempts to find 
corporations liable under criminal or international law.7 Finally, Part 
III addresses whether the law has been headed in precisely the wrong 
direction: rather than asking whether corporations deserve 
constitutional rights, should the real question be whether 
constitutional rights should be asserted against corporations?8 
One point cannot be overemphasized before beginning: my 
argument is not that either corporations or corporate insiders are 
somehow inherently bad; it is merely that recent constitutional 
jurisprudence has given too much power to corporations and those 
who run them in a way that might be detrimental to the broader 
interests of society.9 
                                                                                                                 
 4. See discussion infra Part I. 
 5. See discussion infra Part I. 
 6. See discussion infra Part I. 
 7. See discussion infra Part II. 
 8. See discussion infra Part III. 
 9. Cf. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
129 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random House, Inc. 1937) (1776) (“The pretence that corporations are 
necessary for the better government of the trade, is without any foundation.”). 
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I. TOWARD A THEORY OF THE CORPORATION 
CORPORATE ENTITY 
The Oklahoma Ligno and Lithograph Co 
Of Maine doing business in Delaware Tennessee 
Missouri Montana Ohio and Idaho 
With a corporate existence distinct from that of the 
Secretary Treasurer President Directors or 
Majority stockholder being empowered to acquire 
As principal agent trustee licensee licensor 
Any or all in part or in parts or entire 
Etchings impressions engravings engravures prints 
Paintings oil-paintings canvases portraits vignettes 
Tableaux ceramics relievos insculptures tints 
Art-treasures or masterpieces complete or in sets 
The Oklahoma Ligno and Lithograph Co 
Weeps at a nude by Michael Angelo. 
— Archibald MacLeish10 
There are three competing conceptions of the corporation: the 
artificial entity theory, the associational theory, and the real entity 
theory. Additionally, there is the view that theory does not matter. 
First, I outline each of these four perspectives and highlight examples 
from Supreme Court jurisprudence. Next, I argue—contrary to 
current conventional wisdom—that the only coherent 
conceptualization of the corporation is the artificial entity theory. 
A. Competing Conceptions 
The original theory of the corporation was the artificial entity 
theory where the corporation is “regarded as an ‘artificial being’ 
created by the state with powers strictly limited by its charter of 
incorporation.”11 Most importantly for our purposes, “[u]nder this 
                                                                                                                 
 10. Archibald MacLeish, Apologia, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1505, 1507 (1972). 
 11. Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. 
REV. 173, 181 (1985); see also id. at 184 (“The traditional conception, derived from the ante-bellum 
5
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view, corporations cannot assert constitutional rights against the 
state, their creator.”12 Courts have occasionally used this theory13 in 
older cases, but it is currently out of vogue.14 For instance, in Bank of 
Augusta, the Supreme Court relied on the theory to deny corporations 
citizenship under the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause.15 
The second theory sees the corporation as an aggregate or 
association of the shareholders comprising it.16 Through this 
metaphor, rights that individuals qua individuals might have are 
magically transferred to the corporation:17 to the extent the aggregate 
theory emphasizes shareholders and not the state it provides a 
conceptual framework with which to oppose governmental 
regulation.18 
                                                                                                                 
grant theory, as well as older English corporation law, characterized the corporation as ‘an artificial 
entity created by positive law.’”). 
 12. Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS 
L.J. 577, 580 (1990); see also Daniel Lipton, Note, Corporate Capacity for Crime and Politics: 
Defining Corporate Personhood at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, 96 VA. L. REV. 1911, 1915 
(2010) (“Artificial entity theory viewed the corporation as nothing more than a creature of the law, 
whose rights consisted only of those conferred by the state.”); Michael D. Rivard, Comment, Toward a 
General Theory of Constitutional Personhood: A Theory of Constitutional Personhood for Transgenic 
Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1455 (1992) (“The artificial entity theory holds that the 
corporation is a creature of state law, and that the state may deny liberty rights to its legal creation.”). 
 13. See Legal Fiction, supra note 2, at 1752 (“In some cases, courts have emphasized the artificiality 
of corporations, holding that rights that inhere in humans as humans may not be extended to nonhuman 
entities; the assumption that legal personhood derives primarily from humanness has clearly animated 
this approach.”). 
 14. The classic and oft-quoted articulation of artificial entity theory derives from Justice Marshall’s 
famous opinion in Dartmouth College where he stated that a corporation “is an artificial being, invisible, 
intangible, . . . possess[ing] only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either 
expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.” Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819). 
 15. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586–88 (1839). 
 16. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 
1641 (2011) (“[T]he ‘aggregate’ theory, looked through the corporate form to the individuals behind it. 
This view regarded the corporation as a collection of its individual members, the shareholders.”); 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, To Be or Not to Be? Citizens United and the Corporate Form 1 (Univ. of Mich. 
Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 184, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1546087 (commenting on “the aggregate theory, which views the corporation 
as an aggregate of its members or shareholders”). 
 17. See Legal Fiction, supra note 2, at 1753 (“Alternatively, courts have emphasized the human 
individuals that constitute the corporation, deploying the corporate personhood metaphor as a means of 
protecting those individuals’ rights.”); Rivard, supra note 12, at 1455–56 (“The aggregate entity theory 
holds that natural persons within the corporation justify granting liberty rights to a corporation, to 
protect the rights of natural persons within it.”). 
 18. See David Millon, The Ambiguous Significance of Corporate Personhood 4 (Washington & Lee 
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 01-6, 2001), available at 
6
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol29/iss3/1
2013] (MIS)CONCEPTIONS OF THE CORPORATION 737 
Two interesting points are worth noting with regard to the 
aggregate theory. First, the corporate lawyers espousing this theory 
did so by claiming an analogy to partnership and contract.19 As 
Morton Horwitz notes, “[i]n reaction to the grant [artificial entity] 
theory, some legal writers during the 1880s began to put forth a polar 
opposite conception of the corporation as a creature of free contract 
among individual shareholders, no different, in effect, from a 
partnership.”20 While early theorists emphasized the partnership 
analogy, the more recent focus—as epitomized by modern 
contractualists—is to argue that corporations are merely “a set of 
contracts created through private ordering that should be protected 
from government interference.”21 As leading contractual theorist 
Larry Ribstein puts it, “[t]he corporate contract 
theory . . . characterizes corporations like any other contracts. Under 
this theory, any government regulation that constrains the exercise of 
constitutional rights would have to be justified to the same extent as 
it would with respect to other types of contracts.”22 
                                                                                                                 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=264141 (“Opponents of governmental regulation of the corporation relied on 
the aggregate characterization. . . . The aggregate theory challenged the older notion that the corporation 
was an entity or person created by the state.”). 
 19. In the words of one commentator: 
Faced with public hostility towards large business and a crippled legal conception of 
the corporate form, some members of the corporate bar put forward a modification of the 
fictive person formula of the corporation during the 1880s. These attorneys hoped to 
expand the rights of corporations while preserving their structural organization by 
suggesting that the proper way to think of corporations was that they were similar to 
partnerships. 
Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1457 (1987). 
 20. Horwitz, supra note 11, at 184; see also Pollman, supra note 16, at 1641 (“The [aggregate] 
theory had roots in a view of the corporation as a partnership or contract among the shareholders.”). 
 21. Pollman, supra note 16, at 1666; see also id. at 1667 (“[T]he contract view has been 
characterized as simply a reinvention of the aggregate theory representing the opposite pole in a debate 
with the classic concession theory.”); Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate “Person”: A New Analytical 
Approach to a Flawed Method of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 83 (2005) 
(“[I]ndividualists advocated a contractual theory, which built on and refined the aggregate entity 
theory.”). 
 22. Larry E. Ribstein, The Constitutional Conception of the Corporation, 4 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 95, 
109 (1995). 
7
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Second, the original emphasis of the associational theory was on 
protecting the property rights of shareholders.23 As Herbert 
Hovenkamp observes in his analysis of Santa Clara: 
The constitutional doctrine of “personhood” was the Supreme 
Court’s solution to two problems. The first problem was 
guaranteeing that the owners of property held in the name of a 
corporation would receive the same constitutional protections as 
the owners of property held in their own name. The second 
problem, which lies below the surface, was how to assign the 
power to assert constitutional rights in corporately held 
property.24 
In sum, the idea is that since the property interests of the corporation 
can be traced back to the shareholders, the corporation should be able 
to assert those rights.25 This traceability rationale has been extended 
and applied, most notably and controversially, to speech; in other 
words, the corporation’s right to speak is justified based on the fact 
that the corporation represents an association of individuals.26 
                                                                                                                 
 23. See, e.g., Mark, supra note 19, at 1458 (“Having grounded the protection of corporate property 
in the rights of the shareholders, the treatise writers also moved to establish the legitimacy of the 
corporate structure on non-legal foundations.”). 
 24. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 
1641 (1988); see also id. at 1643 (“The best explanation of Santa Clara is that by 1886 both state and 
federal courts agreed that, in most cases, the corporation, rather than its shareholders, must be the named 
party to the corporation’s litigation.”). Cf. Millon, supra note 18, at 17 (“The property rights argument, 
which had its roots in old ideas about the ownership of business organizations, therefore supported the 
view that shareholders, among all the constituencies interested in a corporation’s behavior, should hold a 
place of primacy.”). 
 25. As Hovenkamp describes it: 
The Court might have chosen another route for giving what little fourteenth 
amendment protection existed to private property owned by corporations. It might have 
said that the corporation represents the constitutional property rights of its shareholders. 
But that would have left the Court in a quagmire concerning one person’s right to assert 
the constitutional claims of another. Worse, it might have opened the door to shareholder 
participation in constitutional litigation involving the corporation, since the shareholders’ 
rights were at stake. 
Hovenkamp, supra note 24, at 1643. 
 26. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson, No Middle Ground? Reflections on the Citizens United Decision, 
96 IOWA L. REV. 649, 663 (2011) (“The central distinction is between collective speech that can be 
traced to individuals’ intentions and that which cannot, between speech protected as function of the 
individual speaker’s liberty and speech that cannot be justified in the name of liberty.”); Charles R. 
8
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Most crucially, careful scholars suggest that the associational 
theory—undergirded by property rights—explains the stunningly 
sweeping grant of constitutional rights bestowed upon corporations in 
the headnote of the Supreme Court’s 1886 Santa Clara opinion, 
which asserted that “The court does not wish to hear argument on the 
question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution . . . applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion 
that it does.”27 To be sure, the headnote is deeply troubling in simply 
concluding, without any analysis whatever, that corporations should 
be granted protections under the Fourteenth Amendment.28 Thus, 
Santa Clara has been quite powerfully and correctly criticized.29 As 
Morton Horwitz’s careful historical analysis suggests, however, the 
Court’s conclusory statement was most likely predicated on the 
associational theory—more specifically, protecting the property 
rights of the corporation’s constituent shareholders: 
In Santa Clara a “natural entity” theory was unnecessary for 
the immediate task of constitutionalizing corporate property 
rights. An “aggregate” or “partnership” or “contractual” 
vision of the corporation . . . was sufficient to focus the 
                                                                                                                 
O’Kelley, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Expression and 
the Corporation after First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347, 1366 (1979) (“Under the 
associational rationale, however, when individuals with a desire to express their common views exercise 
their freedom of expression through the medium of a corporation and its agents, the corporation may 
assert that the expression is protected under the first amendment.”). 
 27. Cnty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886). 
 28. See, e.g., Krannich, supra note 21, at 78 (“Santa Clara may be viewed as the watershed case for 
corporate constitutional rights, for by holding that a corporation is a constitutional ‘person’ under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it provided the foundation for all corporate constitutional rights.”). 
 29. As Charles Reich laments: 
In 1886, the U.S. Supreme Court made a major and radical change in the nation’s 
charter. The Court held that corporations were “persons” entitled to certain of the rights 
and protections given to individuals by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This 
decision, which was reached by a Court that did not even hear argument on the issue and 
cited no basis for its “interpretation,” was revolutionary . . . . 
CHARLES A. REICH, OPPOSING THE SYSTEM 142 (1995) (citation omitted); see also First Nat’l Bank of 
Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 822 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“This Court decided at an early 
date, with neither argument nor discussion, that a business corporation is a ‘person’ entitled to the 
protection of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (citing Santa Clara, 118 U.S. 
at 409)); Krannich, supra note 21, at 93 (“This lack of reasoning and analysis is troubling given that 
Santa Clara has proven to be a fountainhead for all other corporate constitutional rights. This suggests a 
foundational issue for later adjudications of corporate personhood.”). 
9
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conceptual emphasis on the property rights of shareholders. 
Either a partnership or natural entity view could equally 
successfully have subverted the dominant “artificial entity” view 
of the corporation as a creature of the state.30 
Similarly, Herbert Hovenkamp suggests that “[a]t bottom, the 
corporate personhood doctrine of Santa Clara represented an 
efficient way for the corporation to assert the property rights of its 
shareholders.”31 Some observers suggest that the headnote was 
essentially taken from Justice Field’s opinion in The Railroad Tax 
Cases, which espoused an associational theory of the corporation 
with an ostensible focus on property rights.32 There, Justice Field 
asserted that corporations “have never been considered citizens for 
any other purpose than the protection of the property rights of the 
corporators.”33 By contrast, the “prohibition against the deprivation 
of life and liberty in the . . . [F]ifth [A]mendment does not apply to 
corporations, because . . . the lives and liberties of the individual 
corporators are not the life and liberty of the corporation.”34 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Horwitz, supra note 11, at 223 (emphasis added); see also Lipton, supra note 12, at 1942 (“So, 
when Justice Morrison Waite declared in one short paragraph in Santa Clara County that the Justices 
would not entertain the question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment afforded protections to 
corporations as persons, he was relying upon the established proposition that corporate property was to 
be treated no differently than individual property.”). 
 31. Hovenkamp, supra note 24, at 1649. Cf. Lipton, supra note 12, at 1935 (“The courts viewed 
corporate personhood as an extension of property interests.”); Mark, supra note 19, at 1464 (“Because 
court reporters, even Supreme Court reporters, are not sources of doctrine, it is impossible to assume 
that the court meant to do anything more than accept the argument that corporate property was protected 
as property of the corporators, no matter what uses the Court’s announcement was put to in later 
cases.”). 
 32. See Cnty. of San Mateo v S. Pac. R. Co. (The Railroad Tax Cases), 13 F. 722, 744 (Field, Circuit 
Justice, C.C.D. Cal 1882) (“It would be a most singular result if a constitutional provision intended for 
the protection of every person against partial and discriminating legislation by the states, should cease to 
exert such protection the moment the person becomes a member of a corporation. . . . [W]henever a 
provision of the constitution, or of a law, guaranties to persons the enjoyment of property, or affords to 
them means for its protection . . . the benefits of the provision extend to corporations . . . .”). Cf. Mark, 
supra note 19, at 1463 (“The evidence suggests that Conkling [the lawyer representing the railroads] and 
Justice Field, the likeliest sources for a new vision of the corporation in Santa Clara, could not have had 
in mind anything but the partnership analogy that they had espoused in The Railroad Tax Cases.”). 
 33. The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. at 747; see also O’Kelley, supra note 26, at 1362 (“If a 
constitutional right to protect property or business would be available to a natural person, then, under the 
Field rationale, the Court has consistently held that the right is equally available to a corporation for the 
protection of its property.”). 
 34. The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. at 747. 
10
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Subsequent Supreme Court cases revealed ambivalence in 
vacillating between the associational and artificial entity theory. For 
instance, two years after Santa Clara, in Pembina, the Court relied on 
the artificial entity theory in refusing to recognize corporations as 
“citizens” under the Privileges and Immunities Clause35—yet it relied 
on the associational theory to grant corporations Equal Protection and 
Due Process rights.36 Similarly, in the 1906 case of Hale v. Henkel, 
the Court used the artificial entity theory to hold that corporations do 
not enjoy rights against self-incrimination under the Fifth 
Amendment,37 while using the associational theory to give 
corporations protections against unreasonable searches and seizures 
under the Fourth Amendment.38 Though no longer prominent in 
constitutional discourse, the associational theory occasionally 
reappears in newer cases when granting corporations constitutional 
rights. Perhaps most notably, the majority in Citizens United 
conceptualizes corporations as “associations of citizens,”39 as does 
Justice Scalia in his concurrence.40 
The third theory, as audacious as it is oddly popular, is to treat the 
corporation as a real entity. As strange as it might appear, this theory 
“posited that the corporation was a naturally occurring being, 
independent of the law and separate from its individual shareholders. 
The corporation, according to this theory, possessed both free will 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 187 (1888) (“Nor 
does the clause of the constitution declaring that the ‘citizens of each state shall be entitled to all 
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states’ have any bearing upon the question of the 
validity of the license tax in question. Corporations are not citizens within the meaning of that clause.”). 
 36. Id. at 189 (“Under the designation of ‘person’ there is no doubt that a private corporation is 
included. Such corporations are merely associations of individuals united for a special purpose, and 
permitted to do business under a particular name, and have a succession of members without 
dissolution.”). 
 37. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906) (“[T]he corporation is a creature of the 
state . . . presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public.”). 
 38. Id. at 76 (“[a] corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an assumed name 
and with a distinct legal entity”). 
 39. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, ___, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904 (2010); see 
also id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 904 (“If the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress from 
fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply engaging in political speech.”). 
 40. Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 928 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“All the provisions of the Bill of Rights set 
forth the rights of individual men and women—not, for example, of trees or polar bears. But the 
individual person’s right to speak includes the right to speak in association with other individual 
persons.”). 
11
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and morality and could claim and assert rights, as would a natural 
person.” 41 An anthropomorphized corporation, in turn, becomes an 
entity increasingly worthy of legal protection.42 
The natural entity theory emerged in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.43 While some scholars suggest that the Supreme 
Court used the natural entity theory as early as 1886 in Santa Clara,44 
its first clear articulation was arguably in the 1910 case Southern 
Railway v. Greene.45 At one level, one can correctly note that this 
historical period coincided with the advent of general incorporation 
statutes, which conveniently deemphasized the role of the state.46 But 
the underlying story is driven by the separation of ownership and 
control. As David Millon suggests: 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Lipton, supra note 12, at 1915; see also Pollman, supra note 16, at 1641–42 (“Also known as the 
natural entity or person theory, this view regarded the corporation as a real entity with a separate 
existence from its shareholders and from the state.”); Rivard, supra note 12, at 1461 (“[T]he real entity 
theory holds that the corporation is like a ‘natural person.’”). 
 42. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 12, at 581 (“The ‘artificial entity’ theory was invoked to deny 
corporations constitutional protection; the ‘natural entity’ theory was used to accord them safeguards.”); 
Legal Fiction, supra note 2, at 1753–54 (“This [natural entity] theory provides the most robust version 
of corporate personhood, and courts invoke it when attempting to extend to corporations the full panoply 
of legal rights. Though it requires a rather extreme anthropomorphization of corporations, this approach 
has found increasing favor with courts.”). 
 43. See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 11, at 185 (“A third theory which emerged during the 1890s also 
sought to represent the corporation as private, yet neither as ‘artificial,’ ‘fictional,’ nor as a creature of 
the state.”). For an early defense of the natural entity theory, see Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate 
Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 253 (1911). 
 44. See Adam Winkler, The Corporation in Election Law, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1243, 1257 (1999) 
(“The Waite Court more or less formally adopted the natural entity view of the corporation in Santa 
Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad in 1886.”). But see Horwitz, supra note 11, at 223 (“The 
Santa Clara case did not represent the triumph of a ‘natural entity’ theory of the corporation.”). 
 45. 216 U.S. 400 (1910). As one commentator suggests: 
The Court quoted Pembina for the proposition that a corporation is a “person,” but 
omitted the portion of the Pembina opinion stating that corporations were “merely 
associations of individuals.” By doing so, the Court implicitly adopted the emerging 
theory of the corporate entity as a real person, entitled to the same rights as individuals. 
Krannich, supra note 21, at 94. 
 46. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 10 (noting that with the move to general incorporation 
statutes, “the artificial entity theory, under which the corporation derives its powers from the state, lost 
most of its appeal, since the state was only vestigially involved in creating corporations. Instead, 
corporations were viewed as separate from both their shareholders and the state, and the real entity view 
reigned supreme”). With general incorporation statutes, incorporation no longer required a special act of 
the legislature. See, e.g., Mark, supra note 19, at 1453 (“In a remarkable innovation in political 
economy, the Jacksonians sought to foster legislative purity as well as restore equality when they 
demanded and ultimately won universal access to the corporate form, with restrictions on the power of 
the legislature to grant special perquisites.”). 
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Growth in enterprise size required capital accumulation, which, 
in turn, meant increasingly wide dispersal of share ownership 
and relatively small individual holdings. This development also 
called for new managerial expertise and a professional class of 
corporate managers emerged to meet that need. In this process, 
shareholders saw their status transformed from active 
entrepreneurs to passive investors whose fortunes depended on 
the efforts of others.47 
Crucially, as Millon points out, “if . . . the corporation was a separate 
entity in its own right, rather than merely an aggregation of people, a 
new governance structure and limited liability for the owners could 
replace old doctrines of partnership law that stood in the way of 
capital formation and professional management.”48 Unlike the 
aggregate theory, which revolves around shareholders, the real entity 
theory effectively deemphasizes these principals to the benefit of 
management.49 
While the real entity theory may legitimate managerial capitalism, 
it also represents a historical change50 that is theoretically 
troublesome.51 It even treats us to oxymoronic rhetoric that appears 
absurd: as if by magic, an artificial entity becomes “real.”52 
Corporations even have human feelings. For example, in granting 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Millon, supra note 18, at 8. 
 48. Id. at 6. Cf. Horwitz, supra note 11, at 185 (“The ‘aggregate’ or contractual view of the 
corporation seemed capable of restricting corporate privileges and, in particular, the rule of limited 
liability.”). 
 49. See, e.g., Mark, supra note 19, at 1472 (“The reality of the corporation apart from its members 
was becoming clearer as the relationship of the shareholders to the operations of the business became 
increasingly distant.”); Rivard, supra note 12, at 1460 (“In addition to separation from the state, a 
corporation under the real entity theory is an entity separate from the shareholders composing it.”); Avi-
Yonah, supra note 16, at 16 (noting the “real entity view, which equates the corporation with its 
management . . . rejected the aggregate view of the corporation as an aggregate of its shareholders”). 
 50. See, e.g., Millon, supra note 18, at 3 (“Although the concept is generally accepted today, 150 
years ago it was by no means clear that the corporation should be thought of as a distinct legal person.”). 
 51. See, e.g., Mark, supra note 19, at 1443 (“The concept of the personified corporation resulted 
from a crisis of legal imagination that accompanied the maturation of America’s economy at the end of 
the nineteenth century and largely preceded the country’s entry into what economic historians call the 
second industrial revolution.”). 
 52. See id. at 1471 (“Even the clarifying adjective ‘real’ helped but little, for something artificial 
could be real.”). 
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double jeopardy protection to corporations, the Supreme Court was 
worried about “embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling 
him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity as well as 
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found 
guilty.”53 Or, in extending Fourth Amendment protections, the Court 
tells us that a corporation “plainly has a reasonable, legitimate, and 
objective expectation of privacy within the interior of its covered 
buildings, and it is equally clear that expectation is one society is 
prepared to observe.”54 In a remarkable metaphysical feat, a piece of 
paper labeled a corporation can, inter alia, be anxious and insecure 
while expecting privacy.55 
As one commentator sums up: 
Personification with its roots in historic theological disputes 
and modern business necessity, had proved to be a potent symbol 
to legitimate the autonomous business corporation and its 
management. Private property rights had been transferred to 
associations, associations had themselves become politically 
legitimate, and the combination had helped foster modern 
political economy. The corporation, once the derivative tool of 
the state, had become its rival, and the successes of autonomous 
corporate management turned the basis for belief in an 
individualist conception of property on its head. The protests of 
modern legists notwithstanding, the business corporation had 
become the quintessential economic man.56 
Ascribing personhood to a corporation is easy; the problem, as I will 
argue below, is that none of the theories used to justify this heroic 
grant make sense. 
                                                                                                                 
 53. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977). 
 54. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236 (1986). 
 55. Cf. Jill E. Fisch, The “Bad Man” Goes to Washington: The Effect of Political Influence on 
Corporate Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1599 (2006) (“Because corporations are artificial entities, 
it is difficult to identify a source of their moral obligations.”). 
 56. Mark, supra note 19, at 1482–83. 
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The last theory—or, perhaps more aptly, “non-theory”—is that a 
corporation theory does not matter. Perhaps the canonical text in this 
tradition is John Dewey’s famous article, written in 1926, where he 
argued that: 
As far as the historical survey implies a plea for anything, it is a 
plea for disengaging specific issues and disputes which arise 
from entanglement with any concept of personality which is 
other than a restatement that such and such rights and duties, 
benefits and burdens, accrue and are to be maintained and 
distributed in such and such ways, and in such and such 
situations.57 
As one commentator observes, after “Dewey’s stunning eulogy”58 
and by the 1940s: 
the place of the corporation in law had ceased to be 
controversial, and both theoreticians and practitioners concerned 
themselves instead with organizational theory and economic 
analysis of corporate behavior. The corporation as a legal 
institution ceased to be of interest. The historical and 
jurisprudential debates which had consumed the energies of 
some of the leading legal scholars were relegated to the 
introductory pages of corporation law textbooks, if they were 
discussed at all. As a result, a modern lawyer knows only that a 
corporation is considered a legal person but finds that 
terminology devoid of content.59 
                                                                                                                 
 57. John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 669; 
see also id. at 673 (claiming that one must “enforce the value of eliminating the idea of personality until 
the concrete facts and relations involved have been faced and stated on their own account”). 
 58. Mark, supra note 19, at 1480. 
 59. Id. at 1441 (emphasis added); see also Horwitz, supra note 11, at 175 (“There are very few 
discussions of corporate personality after Dewey. The Legal Realists in general had succeeded in 
persuading legal thinkers that highly abstract and general legal conceptions were simply part of what 
Felix Cohen, quoting von Jhering, derisively called ‘the heaven of legal concepts.’”); Pollman, supra 
note 16, at 1652 (“After this debate quieted, most corporate law scholars simply accepted corporate 
personhood as a given, without pushing for a particular philosophical conception of the corporation to 
15
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Most crucially for our purposes, it seems that the Supreme Court—
whether intentionally or not—has bought into Dewey’s claim and, to 
a large extent, stopped trying to offer a coherent theory of the 
corporation.60 
Nowhere is this sad reality more present than in the context of the 
First Amendment. Stated plainly, perhaps the most powerful 
rhetorical move the Court has made in justifying ever-increasing free 
speech rights for corporations has been to deflect attention away from 
the source of the speech and instead speak of speech in abstract 
generalities. For instance, the majority in Bellotti claims that “[t]he 
inherent worth of the speech . . . does not depend upon the identity of 
its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.”61 
Similarly, the Citizens United opinion asserts that “[t]he Court has 
thus rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or 
other associations should be treated differently under the First 
Amendment simply because such associations are not ‘natural 
persons.’”62 
As an instrumental move to grant corporations greater rights, 
deflecting attention away from any conceptualization of the speaker 
is brilliant. As Adam Winkler notes, for example, with respect to 
Justice Powell’s majority opinion in Bellotti: “[b]y . . . ignoring the 
corporate identity of the speaker, Powell rendered the corporate 
entity invisible while at the same time formalizing its equal rights.”63 
                                                                                                                 
ground this concept.”). 
 60. See Pollman, supra note 16, at 1647 (“Despite robust debate of corporate personality from the 
turn of the century to the 1930s, as well as dissenting calls for reexamination of the doctrine, the Court 
has not grounded the expansions of corporate rights in a coherent concept of corporate personhood nor 
used a consistent approach in determining the scope of corporate rights.”). 
 61. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978); see also id. at 784 (“We thus find 
no support in the First or Fourteenth Amendment, or in the decisions of this Court, for the proposition 
that speech that otherwise would be within the protection of the First Amendment loses that protection 
simply because its source is a corporation that cannot prove, to the satisfaction of a court, a material 
effect on its business or property.”). 
 62. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 900. 
 63. Winkler, supra note 44, at 1259; see also Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
133, 196 (1998) (“The Court’s finding that unlimited corporate initiative speech served hearers’ rights 
rested on no articulated understanding of corporations as institutions.”). Cf. Mayer, supra note 12, at 633 
(“In both the political speech and the commercial speech context the question became not whether the 
party asserting the right (a corporation) was entitled to free speech protections, but whether assertion of 
the right furthered free and open debate.”); Saul Zipkin, The Election Period and Regulation of the 
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But it defies logic and constitutional history. It might be banal to note 
that “[a]rtificial legal entities do not assemble to protest, to hold 
signs, to sing songs, etc., though the few who rule them may hire 
people to do these things. They don’t speak or write either, though 
they may hire people to do these things for them.”64 There is also a 
line-drawing problem: if speech is speech regardless of source, and 
voting is a form of speech, then why should corporations not be 
given a right to vote?65 
More generally, as Randall Bezanson notes, “[w]ithout a speaker 
an anchor of the First Amendment is missing.”66 He continues: 
In the late eighteenth century the idea of speech without a 
speaker was unthinkable. The question, “Who is the speaker?” 
was redundant. Speech and speaking, as I have used the terms, 
were largely, if not exclusively, synonymous. Except for 
government, there were few large institutions divorced from the 
personality and will of a single individual. The only exception 
was the press.67 
He further argues: 
It is therefore clear that those who drafted the First 
Amendment could have had nothing remotely approximating the 
institutional and representational speaker of today in mind. But I 
draw from this conclusion the conviction that what the Framers 
                                                                                                                 
Democratic Process, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 533, 581 (2010) (“This ‘the speech not the speaker’ 
approach frames two important moves: first, it concentrates the inquiry on the speech itself, asking if it 
is the kind of expression protected by the First Amendment; and second, it reflects constitutional 
protection of the deliberative environment rather than the speaker personally.”). 
 64. Michael Kent Curtis, Citizens United and Davis v. FEC: Lochner on Steroids and Democracy on 
Life Support 17 (Wake Forest Univ. Legal Studies, Paper No. 1685459, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1685459. 
 65. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 948 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Under the 
majority’s view, I suppose it may be a First Amendment problem that corporations are not permitted to 
vote, given that voting is, among other things, a form of speech.”). Cf. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Breaching 
a Leaking Dam?: Corporate Money and Elections, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 91, 126 (2009) (“[U]nlike 
individuals, corporations are not voters and so have no inherent right to influence elections.”). 
 66. Randall P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 IOWA L. REV. 735, 737 (1995). 
 67. Id. at 809. 
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therefore did have in mind was individual speech, and individual 
speech alone.68 
As Justice Stevens reminds us in his Citizens United dissent, the 
overall point is simple: “The fact that corporations are different from 
human beings might seem to need no elaboration, except that the 
majority opinion almost completely elides it.”69 
Contemporaneously with this anti-theoretical fashion, rights for 
corporations have expanded dramatically over the past fifty years.70 
As one observer carefully notes: 
Despite earlier assertions of corporate personhood in the 
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment context, corporations did not come to 
rely on Bill of Rights protections until quite recently. As late as 
1960 the corporation arguably enjoyed only the protection of the 
[F]ifth [A]mendment’s due process clause. Today, the 
corporation boasts a panoply of Bill of Rights protections: [F]irst 
[A]mendment guarantees of political speech, commercial speech, 
and negative free speech rights; [F]ourth [A]mendment 
safeguards against unreasonable regulatory searches; [F]ifth 
[A]mendment double jeopardy and liberty rights; and [S]ixth and 
[S]eventh [A]mendment entitlements to trial by jury.71 
As it stands today, “the right against self-incrimination has been 
virtually the only part of the Bill of Rights that courts have not 
extended to corporations.”72 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Id. 
 69. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 971 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 70. Cf. Legal Fiction, supra note 2, at 1764–65 (“Though there is no social consensus regarding the 
effects of increasingly monolithic business entities on American society, there appears to be no 
abatement to the expansion of freedoms granted corporate actors, a situation that has raised much 
concern.”). 
 71. Mayer, supra note 12, at 582. 
 72. Legal Fiction, supra note 2, at 1752. Corporations also cannot assert the privileges and 
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Note, Constitutional Rights of the Corporate 
Person, 91 YALE L.J. 1641, 1644 (1982) (“The corporation may be deprived of privileges and 
immunities states normally accord their own citizens . . . .”). This right, however, is essentially dormant 
under current jurisprudence. 
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Through this expansion of constitutional rights for corporations, 
however, corporate theory has—even upon cursory glance—been 
shockingly absent. As commentators have variously lamented, “the 
Court has adopted an ad hoc, result-oriented approach to corporate 
rights, which is difficult to reconcile with traditional modes of 
constitutional interpretation”;73 “[m]issing from the Court’s various 
decisions involving corporations is any expressly enunciated 
common rationale”;74 and “[t]here is no way to bring unity to these 
many decisions, for they rest on radically different conceptions of the 
person whose rights and duties receive judicial definition.”75 
Yet it is likely no coincidence that the death of corporate theory 
has coincided with ever-expansive constitutional rights for 
corporations. As one commentator correctly observes, “the Court’s 
modern, pragmatic, antitheoretical approach is the prosaic 
legitimation of the corporation’s constitutional status. This pragmatic 
approach is a less controversial guarantor of corporate rights than a 
theoretical methodology that raises fundamental questions about the 
nature of a corporation and its role in society.”76 Notwithstanding its 
convenience, however, such an antitheoretical approach ducks the 
basic question of whether an artificial entity, such as a corporation, 
should be entitled to constitutional protection.77 Not having a theory 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Krannich, supra note 21, at 64. 
 74. O’Kelley, supra note 26, at 1348. 
 75. Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person, supra note 72, at 1644–45; see also Winkler, 
supra note 63, at 195 n.269 (“[A]pplication of individual rights to corporate entities has been 
inconsistent.”). As one observer carefully summarizes: 
As the Bill of Rights became important to the corporation in the period of Modern 
Regulation and Modern Property, the Court jettisoned theories of corporate personhood. 
Frequently the Court looked to the history of the amendment in question to justify 
corporate rights, as in the case of the [F]ourth [A]mendment; occasionally the Court 
examined the underlying purposes of an amendment, as in its handling of the [F]irst 
[A]mendment; and sometimes the Court conferred Bill of Rights protections on 
corporations with no explanation, as with the [F]ifth, [S]ixth, and [S]eventh 
[A]mendments. 
Mayer, supra note 12, at 629. 
 76. Mayer, supra note 12, at 621; see also id. at 643–44 (“As the metaphor of corporations as 
persons became increasingly strained, the Court abandoned corporate theory in favor of notions about 
commercial property, the free market of ideas, and the historical purposes of each amendment.”). 
 77. See Krannich, supra note 21, at 62 (“The result is a foundational problem in corporate 
constitutional law, for the Court has granted corporations constitutional rights without engaging in the 
preliminary inquiry of whether a corporation is entitled to them under the Constitution.”). 
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of constitutional personhood is unsettling and does not inspire 
confidence, to say the least.78 What Justice Black once pointed out in 
the context of the Fourteenth Amendment applies more generally: 
“[i]t requires distortion to read ‘person’ as meaning one thing, then 
another within the same clause and from clause to clause.”79 Put 
bluntly, “[i]n the Court’s corporate constitutional jurisprudence, the 
Court has never set forth a specific test to determine what a 
constitutional ‘person’ is.”80 In the following section, I venture to 
suggest a simple conceptualization. 
B. Coherence Of Artificial Entity Theory 
The artificial entity theory is the most compelling, with alternative 
theories remaining unsatisfactory. The most sophisticated competitor 
is likely the associational theory, which seems to analogize 
corporations to partnerships, beginning most dramatically with Santa 
Clara.81 While it might be superficially attractive to conceptualize 
shareholders in corporations as partners in a partnership, “viewing 
the corporation as just an aggregate of its shareholders can be 
incongruent with modern times, particularly in the large public 
company context. Shareholders in publicly traded corporations are 
not a static set of identifiable human actors and they do not control 
                                                                                                                 
 78. See, e.g., Pollman, supra note 16, at 1657 (“While the Court has significantly expanded 
corporate rights, it has not grounded these expansions in a coherent concept of corporate personhood.”); 
Legal Fiction, supra note 2, at 1759 (“The doctrinal discord in the law of the person results largely from 
the lack of a coherent theory of the person. . . . The absence of any coherent theory raises an inference 
that courts’ determinations of legal personality are strongly result driven, with judges selecting whatever 
theories of personhood suit the outcomes they desire.”); Rivard, supra note 12, at 1445 (“[T]he Supreme 
Court has failed to develop a coherent theory of constitutional personhood. Rather, the Court uses theory 
merely as a post hoc rationalization to justify result-oriented decisions.”). 
 79. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 579 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also 
Thomas W. Joo, The Modern Corporation and Campaign Finance: Incorporating Corporate 
Governance Analysis into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 31 (2001) (“The 
Supreme Court treats corporations as the equivalent of human persons for some constitutional 
purposes.”); Krannich, supra note 21, at 97 (“The Court has never explained why a corporation is a 
person for purposes of double jeopardy, but not for purposes of self-incrimination, despite the fact that 
the use of the term ‘persons’ in the clause is analytically indistinguishable.”); Rivard, supra note 12, at 
1462. 
 80. Krannich, supra note 21, at 90. 
 81. See Mark, supra note 19 at 1463 (“The evidence suggests that Conkling and Justice Field, the 
likeliest sources for a new vision of the corporation in Santa Clara, could not have had in mind anything 
but the partnership analogy that they had espoused in The Railroad Tax Cases.”). 
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day-to-day corporate decision-making.”82 While sophisticated 
defenders of associational theories seem to admit this reality,83 they 
assume that shareholders will be able to defend themselves against 
possible abuses by insiders.84 Sadly, anyone with even a passing 
knowledge of corporate law and governance would recognize these 
assumptions as heroic.85 
The supervening irony here is that rather than empowering 
shareholders, the associational theory disenfranchises them by giving 
the corporation—really, management—standing to assert 
constitutional claims. As Herbert Hovenkamp insightfully suggests: 
The doctrine that a corporation is a constitutional person meant 
that the corporation’s directors or managers could assert its 
constitutional claims. The less-cited corollary was that 
shareholders lacked standing to assert the corporation’s 
constitutional rights, just as they lacked standing to represent the 
corporation in most legal disputes. Had the doctrine of corporate 
constitutional personhood not been developed, corporate 
property still would have been protected by the [F]ourteenth 
[A]mendment. Shareholders, rather than the corporation, would 
have been allowed to assert claims for unconstitutional injuries. 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Pollman, supra note 16, at 1630. 
 83. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 22, at 133 (“Under the contract theory of the corporation, the 
separate corporate entity disappears for constitutional purposes and the speech is attributed to those 
immediately responsible for it. Generally this will be the managers who speak or prepare the speech 
rather than the shareholders who may fund the speech with their investments.”). Cf. O’Kelley, supra 
note 26, at 1363 (“If, for instance, Mobil Oil Corporation pays for an advertisement that expresses 
certain social views, the expression involved is not that of the myriad shareholders, but of the top 
management of Mobil.”). 
 84. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 22, at 135 (“[T]he contract theory assumes that the parties to the 
corporation, like parties to other types of contracts, can protect themselves by investing in corporate 
governance devices that minimize this divergence of interest, and that these contracts are subject to the 
same sort of market discipline that applies to other contracts.”). 
 85. As Russell Stevenson laments: 
[A]s the principal institutional means of legitimating and controlling the power of 
corporate management, shareholder control is a miserable failure. Moreover, the 
perpetuation of the fiction that shareholders do exercise ultimate guiding authority has 
acted as a barrier to real institutional reform because the myth provides nominal 
legitimation of management power. 
Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., Corporations and Social Responsibility: In Search of the Corporate Soul, 42 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 709, 731 (1974). 
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Thus the Supreme Court’s decisions that a corporation is a 
constitutional “person” were an important step in the separation 
of ownership from control that characterized the classical 
corporation.86 
If one were to assume for a moment that these deep problems can be 
overcome, the associational theory still remains unsatisfactory; 
especially in its more modern nexus-of-contracts incarnation, where 
it criticizes the artificial entity theory for emphasizing the role of the 
state.87 But if corporate law is merely contract law, then why 
incorporate? Presumably because incorporation saves on transaction 
costs and offers protections that private contract simply does not 
provide.88 
Perhaps more importantly, the associational theory actually 
performs precious little work. After all, one must now delineate what 
rights are actually “personal” to shareholders but should now be 
asserted by the corporation as its proxy—in effect, all this does is 
shift the analysis to the slippery debate of what makes a right 
“personal.”89 For instance, Bellotti relegates this central question to a 
thoroughly unhelpful footnote90 and the recent FCC v. AT & T 
decision resorts—somewhat stunningly—to using the dictionary 
definition of “personal” to argue that while a statute might define a 
corporation as a “person,” the adjective “personal” cannot modify the 
right of a corporation.91 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Hovenkamp, supra note 24, at 1641. 
 87. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 22, at 98 (“The description of the corporation as a ‘mere creature 
of law’ implies that government has created rights that cannot be created by private contract.”). 
 88. Cf. Mayer, supra note 12, at 658–59 (“Besides perpetual life, corporations enjoy limited liability 
for industrial accidents such as nuclear power disasters, and the use of voluntary bankruptcy and other 
means to dodge financial obligations while remaining in business.”). 
 89. Other related notions such as “traceability” present similar problems. See, e.g., Bezanson, supra 
note 66, at 749 (“The requirement that speech be traceable to the intention and beliefs of individuals in 
order for the liberty of speaking to apply is an important factor in the institutional speech 
calculus . . . .”). 
 90. See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 779 n.14 (1978) (“Whether or not a 
particular guarantee is ‘purely personal’ or is unavailable to corporations for some other reason depends 
on the nature, history, and purpose of the particular constitutional provision.”); see also Rivard, supra 
note 12, at 1464. 
 91. The Court stated that: 
“Personal” ordinarily refers to individuals. We do not usually speak of personal 
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Finally, even if we assume away the separation of ownership and 
control characteristic of the modern public corporation and somehow 
magically manage to define what is “personal” to its constitutive 
shareholders, at a very basic level the associational theory suffers 
from an unrealistic assumption and fallacy. It assumes that the 
group’s positions are those of its individual members92 and ignores 
the “fact that a right is enjoyed by a person in her individual capacity 
says nothing about whether that right should be enjoyed by the 
association that she forms along with other individuals.”93 
For its part, the natural entity theory is more obviously troubling. 
As Lucian Bebchuk and Robert Jackson succinctly observe, “a 
corporation is merely a product of legal rules that govern the 
relationships between shareholders, directors, and executives,”94 
unfortunately, “the rhetorical convention that a corporation is a legal 
person remains, though the convention utterly fails to capture the 
understanding of the corporation conveyed by any modern theory.”95 
Sadly, anthropomorphizing a corporation “does not explain why 
corporations would receive constitutional protections as people.”96 
Finally, Dewey’s denial of theory as being of little import is 
troublesome. As one commentator chronicles, theory can be 
outcome-determinative: 
Moreover, the Court’s very use of corporate personhood theory 
                                                                                                                 
characteristics, personal effects, personal correspondence, personal influence, or personal 
tragedy as referring to corporations or other artificial entities. This is not to say that 
corporations do not have correspondence, influence, or tragedies of their own, only that 
we do not use the word “personal” to describe them. 
FCC v. AT & T, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1182 (2011). 
 92. See, e.g., Bezanson, supra note 66, at 758 (“[T]here has been substantial reason to doubt that the 
speech of the group is a reflection of the views of the individual members.”). 
 93. Amy J. Sepinwall, Citizens United and the Ineluctable Question of Corporate Citizenship, 44 
CONN. L. REV. 575, 584 (2012). 
 94. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 83, 108 (2010). 
 95. Mark, supra note 19, at 1442. 
 96. Pollman, supra note 16, at 1630; see also Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person, supra 
note 72, at 1651 (“The notion that soulless, inarticulate corporations could even hold a political view, let 
alone insist on the right to express it, would be incomprehensible to the scholastic philosophers and the 
classical economists who provided the conceptual ground for earlier explanations of corporate 
personality.”). 
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to decide Bill of Rights cases, as in Hale and Morton Salt, belies 
Dewey’s claims: there is a perfect correlation between the 
invocation of the artificial entity theory and the denial of 
corporate rights. Similarly, there is a perfect correlation between 
the invocation of the natural entity theory, as in Hale and 
Grosjean, and the conferral of corporate rights. In the particular 
context of the corporation’s Bill of Rights, the choice of a 
corporate theory had important consequences.97 
By contrast, the artificial entity theory accords with common sense 
and constitutional history—not to mention it recognizes that 
corporations simply cannot exist without the approbation of the state. 
First and perhaps most fundamentally, it cannot be overemphasized 
that corporations—unlike natural persons—only exist at the will of 
the state.98 Further, these artificial creations—again, unlike natural 
persons—are neither capable of emotion nor action.99 As one scholar 
puts it, “[t]o believe that legal entities are capable of physical acts is a 
category-mistake and any superstructure erected on this category-
mistake may be invalid.”100 Perhaps this disjunction is why lawyers 
need so many contortions to try to convince laypersons that 
corporations are people: “[e]ven in a legal world filled with fictions, 
the corporate claim to personal Bill of Rights guarantees must appear 
fantastic to the non-lawyer.”101 As Justice Rehnquist once 
aphoristically noted in dissent, “[t]he insistence on treating 
identically for constitutional purposes entities that are demonstrably 
                                                                                                                 
 97. Mayer, supra note 12, at 640. 
 98. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 24, at 1645 (“But there is one important difference between 
the natural person’s right to contract and the corporation’s right: the corporation has only those powers 
granted to it by the sovereign.”); Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person, supra note 72, at 1645 
(“The corporation thus exists as a person only because it is recognized by the law, and it is granted 
standing in the court only because it has been brought into being by the state.”). 
 99. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 85, at 710 (“[C]orporate ‘persons’ are deficient in that 
concatenation of spiritual, social, and political characteristics which in human personalities we call the 
‘soul.’”). 
 100. O’Kelley, supra note 26, at 1351. For example, in the context of the First Amendment, “[t]he 
basic intuition is that speech is fundamentally a human act, that for purposes of the First Amendment, 
protected speech is primarily a product of the human act of speaking.” Bezanson, supra note 66, at 755. 
 101. Mayer, supra note 12, at 655; see also Krannich, supra note 21, at 61 (“[A] corporation is simply 
not a ‘person’ as most understand the term.”). 
24
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 1
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol29/iss3/1
2013] (MIS)CONCEPTIONS OF THE CORPORATION 755 
different is as great a jurisprudential sin as treating differently those 
entities which are the same.”102 
In addition to common sense, artificial entity theory also has 
constitutional history on its side. While the word “corporation” does 
not exist in the Constitution,103 the balance of historical analysis 
suggests that the Founding Fathers would not accord constitutional 
personhood to corporations and, in fact, might view the granting of 
such powers with disdain. As background, it is important to 
remember that the Constitution was written at a time when 
“[c]orporations were few and small and of little consequence . . . .”104 
Philosophically, however, their “major premise was the existence of 
a relatively atomistic society, one devoid of aggregations of political 
and economic power greater than those which might be amassed by a 
single individual or at most a family or small partnership.”105 In a 
detailed historical study, Jonathan Marcantel: 
[a]ttempts to discern whether evidence exists indicating that 
corporations are real constitutional entities by analyzing 
contemporary documents from the Constitutional Convention of 
1787, the ratification debates, the ratification debates of the Bill 
of Rights, and the debates preceding ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Taken together, the documents indicate 
the drafters and ratifiers believed the Constitution and its 
amendments protected individual rights. Furthermore, they 
indicate the drafters and ratifiers embraced a concessionary 
doctrinal vision of the corporation that was inconsistent with 
                                                                                                                 
 102. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 35 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
 103. See, e.g., Harold Anthony Lloyd, A Right But Wrong Place: Righting and Rewriting Citizens 
United, 56 S.D. L. REV. 219, 222 (2011) (“On its face, the Constitution provides no corporate 
Constitutional rights at all . . . .”); O’Kelley, supra note 26, at 1352 (“Nowhere in the Constitution does 
the word ‘corporation’ appear.”); Pollman, supra note 16, at 1632 (“[T]he Constitution itself includes no 
specific reference to corporations.”). 
 104. Arthur Selwyn Miller, Toward the “Techno-Corporate” State?—An Essay in American 
Constitutionalism, 14 VILL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1968); see also Pollman, supra note 16, at 1633 (“[S]cholars 
agree that before independence there were only a small handful of corporations.”). 
 105. Stevenson, supra note 85, at 711. Cf. Miller, supra note 104, at 4 (“The 55 men who wrote the 
Constitution foresaw neither the rise of the supercorporation nor the Positive State.”). 
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their vision of constitutional rights.106 
Some examples might reinforce Marcantel’s point. For instance, as 
Randall Bezanson carefully notes: 
If the First Amendment were intended to protect all speech 
without regard to its identifiable human agency—all words and 
images, whatever their origin or intent or effect—there would 
have been no reason to single out the press for explicit 
constitutional protection. The drafters of the First Amendment 
knew that the press was a different kind of speaker than the 
individual.107 
In the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Black once 
forcefully noted the perversion of intent: 
I do not believe the word “person” in the Fourteenth 
Amendment includes corporations . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . The history of the amendment proves that the people were 
told that its purpose was to protect weak and helpless human 
beings and were not told that it was intended to remove 
corporations in any fashion from the control of state 
governments . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . Yet, of the cases in this Court in which the Fourteenth 
Amendment was applied during the first fifty years after its 
adoption, less than one-half of 1 per cent. invoked it in 
                                                                                                                 
 106. Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Corporation as a “Real” Constitutional Person, 11 U.C. DAVIS 
BUS. L.J. 221, 232 (2011); see also id. at 237 (“First, to the extent the drafters discussed corporations in 
the context of constitutional protections, it was only in the sense of state or local authorities as sovereign 
corporations. Second, it is clear the drafters did not use the terms ‘corporation’ and ‘people’ 
coterminously.”). 
 107. Bezanson, supra note 66, at 775; see also Adam Winkler, Corporate Personhood and the Rights 
of Corporate Speech, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863, 863 (2007) (“When the Founders established the 
principle of free speech in both the Federal and state constitutions, corporate speech was far from their 
minds.”). 
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protection of the negro race, and more than 50 per cent. asked 
that its benefits be extended to corporations.108 
As if common sense and constitutional history were not enough, the 
artificial entity theory also recognizes the state’s inextricable role in 
the chartering of corporations. The conventional wisdom is that 
“[v]iewing the corporation as a concession from the state is a relic of 
a time before incorporating became a mere administrative 
formality”109—after all, the move from special incorporation statutes 
to general incorporation statutes seems to minimize the state’s role.110 
But this argument is puzzling: while the steps needed to charter a 
corporation are different, the state still maintains a “traditional 
constitutive role.”111 
A more subtle argument is to note that the availability of different 
jurisdictions within which to incorporate also marginalizes the state’s 
role.112 But there are several problems with this portability argument. 
Most simply, companies tend to incorporate as local subsidiaries 
within countries in which they operate for tax and liability reasons; as 
such, the local subsidiary exists at the grace of the local sovereign.113 
To the extent that the contention revolves around American 
companies incorporating in management-friendly jurisdictions—
                                                                                                                 
 108. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85, 87, 90 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted); see also Krannich, supra note 21, at 95 
(“[U]nder the Fourteenth Amendment the Court has created corporate constitutional rights not implied 
by the text of the Constitution or the intent of its framers.”); Marcantel, supra note 106, at 265 (“In 
sharp distinction, however, the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment did not envision corporations as 
possessing inalienable rights. Quite the contrary, the drafters repeatedly indicated their belief that 
corporations existed and were regulated at the leisure of the legislature.”). 
 109. Pollman, supra note 16, at 1630. 
 110. See, e.g., id. at 1640 (“The economic expansion of the time [late nineteenth century] and the 
transition from special chartering to general incorporation eroded the persuasiveness of the concession 
theory [of the corporation], as the connection between a corporate charter and a state act became less 
significant.”). 
 111. Millon, supra note 18, at 7. 
 112. See, e.g., Pollman, supra note 16, at 1661–62 (“Further, as corporations can change their place of 
incorporation, switching state or even country, the description of corporations as a concession from a 
particular state seems a poor fit in our modern, global environment.”); Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 24 
(“[T]he artificial entity theory becomes hard to maintain when management can pick weak countries like 
Bermuda as the country of incorporation for the parent of a multinational.”). 
 113. See, e.g., Pollman, supra note 16, at 1660–61. 
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notably Delaware—and doing business in other states,114 the state’s 
role cannot be so simply dispensed with. First, the company cannot 
exist without the approbation of the incorporating state; second, even 
today there is little to prohibit additional regulation by a sister state of 
the United States.115 
In sum, “this marginalization of the State in discussions of theory 
of the corporation is incorrect both from a positive as well as 
normative perspective.”116 Put simply, “there is no corporation 
without the state.”117 Artificial entity theory is the only theory that 
recognizes this seemingly banal point. 
II. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORPORATE THEORY 
“Only people can have responsibilities. A corporation is an artificial 
person and in this sense may have artificial responsibilities, but 
                                                                                                                 
 114. Id. at 1640 (explaining that “[s]tates like New Jersey and Delaware began to compete for 
corporate taxes and fees by offering a liberal legal environment for incorporation”). 
 115. Those versed in corporate law might argue that the internal affairs doctrine imposes a barrier to 
the regulation of out-of-state corporations. As the U.S. Supreme Court describes it: 
The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle which recognizes that only one 
State should have the authority to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs—matters 
peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation and its current officers, 
directors, and shareholders—because otherwise a corporation could be faced with 
conflicting demands. 
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF 
LAWS § 302 cmt. b (1971)). The internal affairs doctrine, however, does not rise to the level of 
constitutional imperative. As one commentator observes: 
Although the [U.S. Supreme] Court historically has deferred to the law of the state of 
incorporation on issues involving internal affairs, that does not mean that the Court has 
established a constitutional requirement under the commerce clause mandating that the 
law of the state of incorporation be applied on all corporate governance issues. 
Arthur R. Pinto, The Constitution and the Market for Corporate Control: State Takeover Statutes after 
CTS Corp., 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 699, 764–65 (1988) (footnote omitted). In addition, the guidance 
provided by the Restatement of Conflict of Laws provides space to regulate: 
The local law of the state of incorporation will be applied to determine such issues, 
except in the unusual case where, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has 
a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local 
law of the other state will be applied. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302(2); see generally Richard M. Buxbaum, The 
Threatened Constitutionalization of the Internal Affairs Doctrine in Corporation Law, 75 CALIF. L. 
REV. 29 (1987). 
 116. Stefan J. Padfield, Finding State Action When Corporations Govern, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 703, 724 
(2009). 
 117. Id. at 720. 
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‘business’ as a whole cannot be said to have responsibilities, even in 
this vague sense.” 
—Milton Friedman118 
If, as I have argued in Part I, the artificial entity theory makes so 
much sense, then why is it so unpopular? The response lies in 
political economy. Instrumental reasons explain the decline of 
artificial entity theory: an anti-regulatory agenda and a concomitant 
wish to elevate the managerial class. To be sure, there are opposing 
concerns that might emerge to my proposal to restrict the personhood 
of corporations. Some might characterize it as too simplistic an 
approach; others might suggest it would hinder attempts to find 
corporations liable under criminal or international law. But upon 
closer examination, neither of these concerns is convincing. 
A. Decline Of Artificial Entity Theory 
Conceptualizing the corporation as an artificial entity necessarily 
allows the government to place limits on its behavior. After all, if the 
corporation is a creature of the state, then the state can regulate it if it 
wishes. Further, the more the state’s role is emphasized, the less 
power accrues to corporate insiders. I argue that anti-regulatory 
fervor, coupled with a desire to elevate the managerial class in 
society, best explain why artificial entity theory has fallen out of 
favor. Instrumental reasons explain the rise of the associational and 
natural entity theories more than logic might. 
Under the artificial entity theory, as David Millon has succinctly 
noted, “[b]ecause the corporate person was a creature of the state, it 
was assumed to be subject to whatever limitations or regulatory 
burdens might emerge from the political process.”119 In contrast, 
“[b]y appealing to the individual property rights of the shareholders, 
the aggregate idea offered a potentially useful theoretical justification 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its 
Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, (Magazine), at SM17. 
 119. Millon, supra note 18, at 5; see also Pollman, supra note 16, at 1635 (“Under this [artificial 
entity] view the corporation is a legal fiction and incorporation a special privilege or concession 
awarded by the state. Accordingly, this view supported the government-imposed limitations on 
corporations of the time because if incorporation is a state grant, it follows that it can be a limited one.”). 
29
Dibadj: (Mis)Conceptions of the Corporation
Published by Reading Room, 2013
760 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:3 
for shielding big business from public supervision.”120 The natural 
entity theory places government at an even greater distance. As 
Morton Horwitz notes, “[t]he main effect of the natural entity theory 
of the business corporation was to legitimate large scale enterprise 
and to destroy any special basis for state regulation of the corporation 
that derived from its creation by the state.”121 The rhetoric of natural 
entity theory is especially powerful: by equating “corporation” to 
“person,” one is then tempted to transpose the rights of the latter to 
the former.122 
New corporate theories have thus brilliantly served an anti-
regulatory agenda. As Walter Hamilton amusingly observes: 
The legal make-believe that the corporation is a person, the 
ingenuities by which it has been fitted out with a domicile, the 
elaborate web of “as-ifs” which the courts have woven,—have 
put corporate affairs pretty largely out of reach of the regulations 
we decree. . . . ”The corporation” . . . has no anatomical parts to 
be kicked or consigned to calaboose; no conscience to keep it 
awake all night; no soul for whose salvation the parson may 
struggle; no body to be roasted in hell or purged for celestial 
enjoyment. . . . [We cannot lay] bodily hands upon General 
Motors or, Westinghouse . . . [or] incarcerate the Pennsylvania 
Railroad or Standard Oil (N.J.) complete with all its works.123 
                                                                                                                 
 120. Millon, supra note 18, at 5. The idea is essentially the same under the more modern association 
of contracts notion. See id. at 21 (“Efforts by government to impose obligations on the parties to these 
arrangements offend the freedom of contract, anti-redistributive ideology that lies at the heart of the 
nexus-of-contracts agenda.”). 
 121. Horwitz, supra note 11, at 221; see also Rivard, supra note 12, at 1459 (“In contrast to the 
artificial entity theory, the natural entity—or real entity—theory of the corporation constrains the power 
of the state to control its creation.”). 
 122. See Mark, supra note 19, at 1472 (“‘Person’ carried with it powerful connotations in Anglo-
American jurisprudence. The irreducible unit of the common law was the individual person; if the 
corporation was a real person, not an artificial creation of the state, was it not entitled to the same 
respect as any flesh-and-blood person?”). 
 123. RICHARD EELLS & CLARENCE WALTON, CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF BUSINESS: AN 
OUTLINE OF THE MAJOR IDEAS SUSTAINING BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 132, 133 
(1961) (quoting Walter H. Hamilton, On the Composition of the Corporate Veil, Address Before the 
Brandeis Lawyers’ Society (Mar. 21, 1946), in BRANDEIS LAWYERS’ SOC’Y PUBL’NS, 1946, at 4). 
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The risk of all the deference given to corporations and their insiders 
is the drifting toward a new Lochnerism. In the words of one scholar: 
More than the problems of personhood metaphors, concerns 
about judicial legitimacy explain the demise of corporate theory. 
The bestowal of constitutional rights on corporations, via the 
natural entity theory, raises the specter of Lochner. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . In the modern political economy, the question, what is a 
corporation, is every bit as important as the questions about 
freedom of contract and common-law entitlements considered 
during the Lochner period. For the Court to appear to be 
imposing its view of the corporation—and therefore shaping a 
state and imposing an economic view—creates problems of 
legitimacy reminiscent of Lochner.124 
As one commentator aptly observed, “[d]enied the protections of 
Lochner and substantive due process, corporate managers merely 
shifted the constitutional battle from the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment 
to the [F]irst, [F]ourth, and [F]ifth amendments.”125 As such, 
“[b]usinesses now wield the Bill of Rights in much the same way that 
the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment was used during the Progressive era 
when corporations impeded state governmental regulation with 
constitutional roadblocks.”126 
Beyond a desire to fight regulation, the move away from artificial 
entity theory and eventually toward natural entity theory effectively 
provides constitutional cover for the activities of corporate insiders. 
As Herbert Hovenkamp has chronicled, by the late nineteenth 
                                                                                                                 
 124. Mayer, supra note 12, at 645, 646. 
 125. Id. at 606. 
 126. Id. at 577; see also Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under the 
First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 295 (1981) (“Particularly with respect to corporate commercial 
speech, the First Amendment should not become the vehicle for restoring the lenses of the Lochner 
court to judicial scrutiny of economic regulation of either legislative or executive origin.”). Cf. Miller, 
supra note 104, at 5 (“By the mid-1960’s that ‘social revolution’ had become so solidified that 
corporations seem part of the ‘natural’ order of things, so much so that no serious intellectual opposition 
to them is evident.”). 
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century, “the business corporation gradually evolved into a device for 
assembling large amounts of capital in a manner that could be 
controlled efficiently by a small number of managers.”127 The 
problem, of course, is that even the associational view ostensibly 
emphasizes the property rights of shareholder-principals, not 
manager-agents.128 The rather hefty task, then, was somehow to craft 
theoretical support for management control over large 
corporations.129 
At this challenge, the real entity theory proved brilliant. Arguably, 
two subtle analytical moves are at work: first, anthropomorphize the 
corporate entity to somehow detach it from its shareholder-
principals;130 second, effectively emphasize how the now 
anthropomorphized entity can be represented by its directors and 
officers.131 It is also important to note that the real entity theory also 
emerged in a symbiotic relationship with a remarkable liberalization 
of corporate law during the late nineteenth century that only further 
legitimated the power of management over shareholders. As Adam 
Winkler chronicles in helpful detail: 
Traditional doctrines of ultra vires and quo warranto, which 
strictly limited corporate activities to those specified at inception 
or provided for in corporate charters, were watered down—
another expansion of managerial autonomy. The discretion of 
managers over corporate affairs was also augmented by the 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Hovenkamp, supra note 24, at 1595. 
 128. See, e.g., O’Kelley, supra note 26, at 1373 (“In the case of a large corporation, however, the 
views of shareholders and management may diverge, making the associational rationale inapplicable.”). 
As Morton Horwitz observes, “[s]ome of the contractualists seemed to have in the back of their minds 
an ideal of what in a later age would be called ‘shareholder democracy.’ But during the 1880s it was 
beginning to become clear that management, not shareholders, were the real decision-makers in large 
publicly owned enterprises.” Horwitz, supra note 11, at 206. 
 129. See Mark, supra note 19, at 1475 (“The task before those theorists was to explain how 
management control was legitimate.”). 
 130. See Marcantel, supra note 106, at 228 (“As the structure of corporations changed and became 
more management controlled, corporations began to be viewed as no longer representing the rights of 
the individuals who composed them, but rather, as separate bodies that possessed their own values and 
desires independent of their shareholders.”). 
 131. See, e.g., Mark, supra note 19, at 1477 (“The psychological assimilation of the corporation to the 
individual contained the connotative powers of personification while the representative analysis set out 
by Ernst Freund provided a justification for management’s assumption of control of corporate affairs.”). 
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replacement of common law negligence rules governing 
corporate agency with the notoriously management-friendly 
business judgment rule. Stockholders witnessed the diminution 
of their right to oversee management through inspection of the 
corporate account books and ledgers, as state lawmakers 
restricted inspection rights (purportedly to guard against 
corporate espionage). Voting rules within the corporation were 
also transformed in ways that minimized stockholder authority: 
unanimity requirements for fundamental corporate changes 
became majority rules; preferred shares were sold without any 
right to vote attached; and proxy voting, as indicated by the 
example of insurance companies above, ensconced management 
control over firm assets.132 
Helped along by corporate law and concomitant with the rise in 
industrial organization, by the 1920s the real entity theorists had 
essentially won: management was ascendant.133 Sadly enough, the 
past century has seen an erosion of shareholder capitalism.134 Reuven 
Avi-Yonah sums up our sorry state of affairs: 
Why does the real entity view prevail? In part, this is no doubt 
due to the fact that it represents the most congenial view to 
corporate management, because it shields them from undue 
interference from both shareholders and the state. Corporate 
                                                                                                                 
 132. Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance 
Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871, 907–09 (2004); see also Horwitz, supra note 11, at 183 (“The triumph of the 
entity theory parallels another development in late nineteenth century corporate law—the tendency to 
shift power away from shareholders, first in favor of directors and later to professional managers.”). 
 133. See, e.g., Marcantel, supra note 106, at 228 (“And, as those entities grew in size and became 
more controlled by management as opposed to shareholders, the real entity theory grew in 
prominence.”); Mark, supra note 19, at 1474 (“The ascendance of management strengthened the 
analytic force of the real person/real entity theory and was in turn legitimated by it.”). 
 134. As the mutual fund pioneer, John Bogle, laments: 
[C]apitalism has been moving in the wrong direction. We need to reverse its course so 
that the system is once again run in the interest of stockholder-owners rather than in the 
interest of managers . . . . 
 . . . . 
Our society today, then, is no longer an “ownership society.” It has become and 
“intermediation society,” and it is not going back. 
JOHN C. BOGLE, THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL OF CAPITALISM xi (2005). 
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management wields political power and it influences the 
outcome of the debate; judges again and again refer to the 
importance of corporations, by which they mean corporate 
management.135 
Yet the world Avi-Yonah summarizes so well effectively privileges a 
small class of corporate insiders with access to corporate resources—
in a way that is deeply problematic. Not only does it deemphasize the 
property rights of shareholder-principals,136 it does so in a way that is 
antithetical to the principles embodied in our Constitution.137 In the 
words of one scholar: 
The philosophy of private property that informed our founding 
fathers falls apart in a system in which the owners of property no 
longer direct its use. The corporate person is not, the 
protestations of corporate managers to the contrary 
notwithstanding, a member of society in the same sense as the 
individual person. There is no effective mechanism for 
socializing a corporation. It cannot be educated. It cannot be 
shamed. To an increasing extent society is not even capable of 
punishing it. The result is an institution truly responsible to no 
                                                                                                                 
 135. Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 25; see also Horwitz, supra note 11, at 183 (“The collapse of the 
grant [artificial entity] theory eventually produced the best of all possible worlds for the expansion of 
corporate power.”); Legal Fiction, supra note 2, at 1754 (“At least, it does not seem a coincidence that 
as the increasingly complex modern corporation has become increasingly dependent on Bill of Rights 
protections and the American economy has become increasingly dependent on corporations, courts have 
adjusted definitions of personhood to accommodate the modern corporation’s need for these 
protections.”). 
 136. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 85, at 713 (“It has long since been recognized that corporations 
are no longer run for the benefit of shareholders by a management responsive to shareholders, but are by 
and large run by and for a management for whom shareholder benefit is a secondary concern.”). 
 137. For instance, in the context of the First Amendment, “[Bellotti] does not in itself further the 
values protected by the First Amendment. Instead, it constitutionally legitimizes management’s 
discretionary power to use corporate funds in expressing the political views of those who run the 
corporation.” Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person, supra note 72, at 1655; see also O’Kelley, 
supra note 26, at 1351 (“Expression is possible only by natural persons, not by corporations. Only a 
natural person may express himself through a political expenditure. Any expenditure of corporate assets 
for political purposes must be an expression of the natural persons who authorize and direct the 
expenditure.”). 
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one.138 
A fundamental question becomes whether a legal instrument such as 
the Bill of Rights, which was designed to protect minorities from the 
“tyranny of the majority” have led instead “to a tyranny of the 
minority in which the corporate form is manipulated to magnify 
managerial power.”139 
B. Some Misplaced Concerns 
Some thoughtful readers might be concerned about my proposal to 
restrict the personhood of corporations. Some might characterize it as 
too simplistic and stark an approach; others might suggest that it 
would set back efforts to find corporations liable under criminal or 
international law. I argue, however, that while these concerns appear 
serious at first glance, upon closer scrutiny, neither is convincing. 
A critique might begin by noting that not offering constitutional 
protections to corporations is too reductionist an approach. After all, 
are there not situations where the corporation might be exerting a 
right analogous to an individual’s “personal” right?140 As discussed 
in detail above,141 however, this move merely shifts the analytical 
focus to determining what is “personal”—an unsatisfactory, and 
arguably fruitless, exercise. A more intellectually consistent approach 
centers on recognizing that corporations are creatures of statute; as 
such, they only deserve rights granted to them by statute. To belabor 
the obvious, individuals can choose not to form corporations, and 
                                                                                                                 
 138. Stevenson, supra note 85, at 713 (emphasis added). 
 139. Mayer, supra note 12, at 657; see also Horwitz, supra note 11, at 183 (“[T]he [real] entity theory 
produced court decisions that promoted oligarchical tendencies within the business corporation.”); 
Miller, supra note 104, at 40 (“‘Managerial capitalism’ in many respects differs little from ‘managerial 
socialism’; the industrial enterprises of both systems are basically similar.”). Cf. Stevenson, supra note 
85, at 721 (“If forced to choose between the view that ‘the business of business is business’ and the view 
that corporations are perfectly free to wield their economic and political muscle to bring about whatever 
changes in society happen to be thought desirable by a self-perpetuating management oligarchy, I for 
one would ardently advocate the former.”). 
 140. See, e.g., Krannich, supra note 21, at 106 (“More explicitly, a corporation would only be entitled 
to a constitutional right if the values and policies underlying the right are such that the reasons a natural 
person is entitled to the right apply equally to a corporation.”). 
 141. See supra Part I.B. 
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states could even choose not to charter them.142 Human beings 
deserve constitutional protection against possible abuses wrought 
upon them by majoritarian politics; corporations do not.143 
A related, though more nuanced, criticism is that diminishing the 
personhood of corporations might jeopardize the liability of 
corporations under criminal law—perhaps counterintuitively, early 
real entity theorists argued for corporate criminal liability and 
artificial entity theorists fought against it.144 Yet again, however, this 
concern belies crucial differences. To begin with, corporate criminal 
liability has generally emerged through statutes—not common law.145 
                                                                                                                 
 142. Cf. Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person, supra note 72, at 1643 (“If the public good is 
not served by unrestricted corporate involvement in the political process, legislatures are free to limit the 
body corporate to the activity for which it was called into being: business.”). 
 143. Here, I permit myself to diverge from the views of very thoughtful commentators. For example, 
Victor Brudney argues that: 
Corporations are accorded “personality” in order to create a mechanism for saving 
transaction costs in business dealings, not to create autonomous beings. Accordingly, 
they may be deemed legal “persons” separate from their stockholders for many 
constitutional purposes, particularly when corporate dealings with third persons involve 
contract rights, ownership of property, or liability for injuries. Moreover, corporations 
that are in the business of communicating have special ground for claiming protection 
under the First Amendment. 
Brudney, supra note 126, at 240 (footnote omitted). While I agree entirely with the first sentence, I am 
not sure why corporate “contract rights, ownership of property, or liability for injuries” cannot be dealt 
with by statute. “Corporations that are in the business of communicating” could similarly be protected 
by statute—not to mention that there is a specific Press Clause to protect institutional speech. This 
seems to be a point that Brudney appears to acknowledge as well. See id. at 290 (“But whatever may be 
the difficulties at the margin, in general the distinction between communications businesses, which are 
anchored in activities that First Amendment press and association rights protect, and other businesses 
can be articulated in regulatory legislation.”). 
 144. See Lipton, supra note 12, at 1930 (“In the prevailing historical narrative, real entity theorists are 
the proponents of unrestricted corporate power, and artificial entity theorists are the guardians of the 
public interest. Yet, these roles were actually reversed in the context of corporate crime.”). 
 145. As one observer summarizes: 
Under the common law, criminal acts were thought to be beyond the corporate purpose 
and therefore unattributable to the corporate group. In the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, however, Congress and state legislatures enacted statutes that made 
corporations criminally liable for violating certain statutory provisions, while at the same 
time courts became increasingly amenable to the idea of corporate criminal intent. 
Id. at 1913. Cf. Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARV. L 
REV. 105, 123–24 (1888) (“It has often been questioned whether a corporation could commit a tort or 
crime. The better opinion in the Roman law seems to have been that the question should be answered in 
the negative, at least whenever dolus or culpa was necessary to make the act under consideration 
wrongful.”). To be sure, courts have imported common law concepts to fulfill elements of criminal 
liability such as mens rea and actus reus, but the doctrine has evolved in the shadow of statutes and, as 
some have argued, with little justification. Pollman, supra note 16, at 1648 (“With little theoretical 
grounding, courts imported tort and agency principles to hold corporations vicariously liable for 
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As such, there is nothing in my approach that precludes legislatures 
from imposing criminal liability on corporations. 
What about criminal procedure? One supervening irony is that 
criminal liability has actually spawned constitutional protections for 
corporations.146 Further, the extension of corporate personality 
through cases such as Citizens United will only enhance the argument 
that corporations are deserving of even more procedural protections 
under the Constitution. For instance, as Christopher Slobogin 
insightfully asks with respect to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments: 
If corporations are entitled to freedom of speech, and 
protection from unregulated government intrusion is necessary to 
ensure that speech is freely exercised, the Fourth Amendment’s 
application to corporations may need to be revisited. . . . 
. . . . 
The same goes for the privilege against self-incrimination, 
which up to now has not applied to corporations. . . .[I]f 
corporations can possess and exercise a right to speak (per 
Citizens United), they can possess and assert a right not to 
speak.147 
Along the lines of Slobogin’s concern, there is emerging literature on 
whether, as corporations are increasingly equated to people, 
mechanisms such as deferred prosecution and non-prosecution 
agreements will pass constitutional muster.148 By contrast, under my 
                                                                                                                 
criminal acts performed by corporate agents within the scope of employment.”). 
 146. See, e.g., Pollman, supra note 16, at 1648 (“This is striking because many of the constitutional 
rights that corporations enjoy are an outgrowth of the Court’s recognition of the corporation as subject 
to criminal liability. For example, if corporations were not subject to criminal liability there would be no 
need to consider whether they should receive double jeopardy protection.”). 
 147. Christopher Slobogin, Citizens United & Corporate & Human Crime, 14 GREEN BAG 2D 77, 83, 
84 (2010). 
 148. For example: 
Viewed in light of the Court’s traditional understanding that corporations are considered 
to be “persons” under the Constitution, the majority’s suggestion in Citizens United that 
corporations are equal to human beings, at least under the First Amendment’s Free 
Speech Clause, likely affects the way that corporations’ alleged criminal conduct is 
investigated by the government and the manner in which the government addresses 
corporate misconduct. Specifically, a number of standard conditions currently included in 
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approach, corporations would be stripped of these constitutional 
rights: to the extent legislatures wish to impose criminal liability, 
they can also provide procedural safeguards by statute. 
There is a deeper debate, however, that I hope will emerge: is the 
imposition of criminal liability on corporations even a good idea? 
After all, sanctions are limited to fines which too often have little 
deterrent effect, especially given that shareholders are left paying 
them in the end.149 Sadly, corporate agents might view reprehensible 
conduct not in terms of its inherent immorality, but as an economic 
calculation. The concerns of one scholar, written over a century ago, 
are strikingly contemporary: 
Let me ask, if any board of directors, who ever started any 
corporation on a course of criminality, ever was visited with the 
contempt, commission of the same acts by them as individuals 
would have entailed? Do they, indeed, when they authorize 
corporate crime, feel the same contempt for themselves that they 
ought to feel? On the contrary, the commission of such offenses 
is more apt to be discussed around a council board of directors 
with respect solely to its financial risk. They become, or tend to 
become, the soulless intellectual agencies of a soulless non-
intellectual machine. When that point is arrived at, law is to them 
nothing in its majesty, and merely a tyrannical barrier to greed. 
But, if a board of directors who authorize or permit a 
                                                                                                                 
deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements may have to be altered 
or eliminated altogether in response to the humanization of the corporate entity following 
Citizens United. 
Elizabeth R. Sheyn, The Humanization of the Corporate Entity: Changing Views of Corporate Criminal 
Liability in the Wake of Citizens United 51 (June 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/elizabeth_sheyn/1. 
 149. As Russell Stevenson observes: 
An additional problem with regulatory legislation is that most laws intended to regulate 
corporate activity have relied, either explicitly in the design of the statute, or by virtue of 
the way it is applied in practice, on sanctions directed not at the real people who actually 
make corporate decisions, but at the fictional corporate persona. The corporation is, as 
should be known by now, uniquely insensitive to the moral suasion of statutory rules. 
And where, as is usually the case, fiscal penalties imposed are nominal relative to the size 
of the institution on which they are imposed, regulatory statutes influence corporate 
behavior far less than we would desire. 
Stevenson, supra note 85, at 722. 
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corporation to disobey statutes, are put in jail or are condemned 
to wear felons’ stripes, will they, in any gamble upon violation 
gathering dividends for others, defy the law’s commands?150 
Perhaps most crucially, imposing criminal liability on the 
corporation, a piece of paper, conveniently deflects attention from the 
actual wrongdoers: 
[W]e will come greatly nearer to reducing corporate criminal 
violation when we get back to the common-law theory, and more 
convincing will be the thought that nobody can authorize 
anybody or anything to commit a crime. Then all agents of 
corporations will be like agents of individuals. If they violate 
law, there will be no force or power to stand between them and 
its vindication.151 
Or put more starkly, in the words of Charles Reich, “[o]ne of the 
great modern ‘inventions’ is the avoidance of personal responsibility 
by use of the organizational form.”152 
In an analogous critique to that focused on domestic criminal law, 
one might oppose my proposal on the theory that it would hinder 
attempts to find corporations liable under customary international 
law. After all, it would be tempting to find corporations “liable for 
committing, or for their complicity in, human rights violations 
amounting to international crimes, including genocide, slavery, 
human trafficking, forced labor, torture and crimes against 
humanity.”153 Indeed, a particularly relevant and controversial 
                                                                                                                 
 150. N.C. Collier, Impolicy of Modern Decision and Statute Making Corporations Indictable and the 
Confusion in Morals Thus Created, 71 CENT. L.J. 421, 427 (1910). 
 151. Id. (emphasis added). 
 152. REICH, supra note 29, at 173. 
 153. Larry Catá Backer, The United Nations’ “Protect-Respect-Remedy” Project: Operationalizing a 
Global Human Rights Based Framework for the Regulation of Transnational Corporations 19 (Mar. 12–
13, 2010) (unpublished conference paper), available at http://law.scu.edu/corplaw/file/Santa-Clara-
Symposium-Larry-Cata-Backer-Paper-Draft.pdf. 
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example would be the argument that corporations should be brought 
to justice under the Alien Tort Statute.154 
While this argument is very seductive, here too there are several 
responses. First, and by analogy to domestic criminal law and its 
statutes, if the international community wishes to impose liability on 
corporations, it is free to do so through treaties. Second, more 
fundamentally and again drawing parallels to criminal law, one 
wonders whether imposing criminal liability on corporations again 
serves as a convenient deflection away from those with real 
responsibility. As Judge José Cabranes of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit recently noted in his majority opinion 
in Kiobel: 
From the beginning, however, the principle of individual 
liability for violations of international law has been limited to 
natural persons—not “juridical” persons such as corporations—
because the moral responsibility for a crime so heinous and 
unbounded as to rise to the level of an “international crime” has 
rested solely with the individual men and women who have 
perpetrated it.155 
As Judge Leval thoughtfully observed when he concurred in the 
majority’s judgment: 
A corporation, having no body, no soul, and no conscience, is 
incapable of suffering, of remorse, or of pragmatic reassessment 
of its future behavior. Nor can it be incapacitated by 
imprisonment. The only form of punishment readily imposed on 
a corporation is a fine, and this form of punishment, because its 
burden falls on the corporation’s owners or creditors (or even 
possibly its customers if it can succeed in passing on its costs in 
                                                                                                                 
 154. The statute itself is notoriously ambiguous, stating merely that “[t]he district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 155. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2010) (emphasis added), cert 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 248 (2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011). 
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increased prices), may well fail to hurt the persons who were 
responsible for the corporation’s misdeeds. Furthermore, when 
the time comes to impose punishment for past misdeeds, the 
corporation’s owners, directors, and employees may be 
completely different persons from those who held the positions 
at the time of the misconduct. What is more, criminal 
prosecution of the corporation can undermine the objectives of 
criminal law by misdirecting prosecution away from those 
deserving of punishment. . . . For these reasons, criminal 
prosecution of corporations is unknown in many nations of the 
world and is not practiced in international criminal tribunals.156 
Third, and perhaps most subtly, while treating corporations as 
“subjects” of international law may appear seductive from a criminal 
liability standpoint, it could open up a panoply of rights that 
corporations might claim as “people.” As José Alvarez has 
convincingly argued, “[c]ontrary to what many human rights 
advocates apparently believe, those who want to hold corporations 
accountable for international law violations should not be so quick to 
assume that they want corporations to be ‘subjects’ of international 
law.”157 At one level, his point seems straightforward: human rights 
lawyers should not get trapped in the contradiction of wanting 
corporations to be “subjects” of international law when trying to find 
corporations liable but denying this status when corporations wish to 
assert their rights.158 But using the international investment regime—
where, perhaps stunningly, corporations are treated as states in their 
ability to enforce treaty rights directly159—Alvarez also makes a very 
sophisticated point: 
                                                                                                                 
 156. Id. at 168 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 157. José E. Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L 
L. 1, 3 (2011). 
 158. See id. at 23 (“Human rights advocates have paid little attention to the fundamental 
contradictions of insisting that corporations are ‘international legal persons’ or ‘subjects’ for purposes of 
imposing obligations on them (as in ATCA litigation) and resisting that outcome when it comes to 
finding international rights for corporations (as in the investment regime).”). 
 159. As Alvarez notes, “[u]nder most contemporary investment treaties, foreign investors have the 
right to bring direct claims for violations of their treaty rights in various arbitral forums, including the 
World Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).” Id. at 11. The 
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One of the general rationales offered for establishing this 
innovative international [investment] regime is precisely that 
suggested by the majority in Citizens United: Corporations have 
a legitimate role to play in constructing the rule of law and 
democratic society and their rights as persons should be 
respected no less than others. The investment regime just takes 
this rationale one step further to argue that foreign businesses 
should be able to bring international claims against the home 
states in which they operate.160 
To be sure, this analysis does elide the fact that the investment 
regime is treaty-based, whereas customary international law is not. 
But overall, Alvarez’s point is a very powerful one that in many ways 
parallels those of Christopher Slobogin in the domestic criminal 
context: the more corporations are deemed “persons,” the greater 
rights they will claim.161 So simply treating a corporation as a 
“person” or “subject” resolves precious little. In the end, as Alvarez 
warns, “[i]nternational lawyers should spend their time addressing 
which international rules apply to corporations rather than whether 
corporations are or are not ‘subjects’ of international law.”162 
                                                                                                                 
features of this regime, however, are troubling: 
Under investor-state arbitration, therefore, states are mostly passive participants in a 
game controlled by corporate plaintiffs in which the latter play the jurisgenerative role 
that in the WTO and throughout much of international law is formally reserved to states. 
As students of the burgeoning investor-state arbitral case law attest, states have in effect 
delegated the making of international investment law to third party private attorneys 
general, namely the wealthy multinationals that can afford to bring the cases and generate 
the case law. 
Id. at 11–12. 
 160. Id. at 14; see also id. at 23 (“The principal lesson to take from decisions like Citizens United is 
simple: Beware the consequences of equating corporations to persons.”). 
 161. See Slobogin, supra note 147, at 83–84. 
 162. Alvarez, supra note 157, at 31; see also id. at 30 (“[T]he only viable approach is to delineate 
corporate rights and obligations inductively from the bottom up: to define the rights and obligations of 
corporations by what those entities are and what they are not.”). 
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III. REFRAMING THE DEBATE: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST 
CORPORATIONS? 
History appears to exhibit a cycle in which social organization 
is sometimes dominated by organization and ascendant power, 
and at other times by highly individualized life with a high 
degree of individualized possessory property. The core of the 
feudal system rested not on property but on power. This was 
gradually dispersed: the collectivized power of the feudal dukes 
dissipated into the individual titles of tiny landholders in the 
nineteenth century. The industrial era appears to have compelled 
a large measure of recollectivization of property. . . . In great 
areas, we have moved away from the individual and possessory 
property stage into a stage of great organization. But 
organization, economic as well as political, turns on power, not 
on title. Protection of individual liberty might possibly be carried 
out by impeding or preventing recollectivization of economic 
function with its attendant increase of power in private or public 
hands or in both working together. 
—Adolf Berle163 
Having spent the bulk of this Article arguing that corporations 
should not be given constitutional rights, it might be worthwhile to 
end by asking if the debate about whether corporations deserve 
constitutional protection is even the right one to have. Rather than 
asking whether corporations should benefit from constitutional rights, 
the appropriate inquiry may be whether human beings should be able 
to assert constitutional rights against corporations. Put starkly, 
current jurisprudential debates might be arguing the wrong 
question.164 
                                                                                                                 
 163. A. A. Berle, Jr., The Developing Law of Corporate Concentration, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 639, 660 
(1952). 
 164. Cf. Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1661, 1699 (1989) 
(“There is, of course, something worse than asking unintelligible questions—and that is answering 
them.”). 
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As Charles Reich has provocatively argued, perhaps we have 
deluded ourselves into a bifurcation between “public” and “private”: 
By dividing America into these two sectors, we are given a view 
of reality where the private individual and the giant corporation 
are considered to be alike. All distinctions between the personal 
zone of individuals and the organized zone of corporate power 
are wiped out. . . . The existence of a deepening conflict between 
the interests of individuals and the interest of “private” 
corporations is rendered invisible.165 
Crucially, “[t]he image of the ‘private sector’ as a zone of freedom is 
further supported by describing our economy as a ‘free market’ rather 
than a carefully managed system with restricted opportunity. The 
market image suggests free and equal individuals exchanging 
handmade shoes for homegrown geese in a village square.”166 
Contrary to this idyllic idealization, Reich argues that “it is big 
business, not big government, that primarily regulates the lives of 
ordinary Americans”167—a pernicious phenomenon he labels 
“economic government.”168 
The great stumbling block to such a project, of course, is the state 
action doctrine: corporations are not public actors against whom 
individuals typically assert constitutional rights.169 Yet this roadblock 
                                                                                                                 
 165. REICH, supra note 29, at 159–60 (emphasis added). 
 166. Id. at 161. 
 167. Id. at 41; see also id. at 77 (“The world of 1776, when Adam Smith published his book 
describing the free market, has been replaced by a centralized and highly organized economy; it is 
absurd to assume that the Adam Smith economic model still operates in the same way.”); Id. at 169 (“A 
managerial economy is morally different from a free market because the individual’s economic fate is 
controlled by others who thereby incur responsibility for their exercise of power.”). 
 168. See, e.g., id. at 20 (“Economic government is the dominant partner, public government the 
subordinate, in the totality of government that affects our daily lives.”); Id. at 21 (“Through its control of 
jobs and our livelihood, economic government is responsible for far more coercion in our daily lives 
than public government.”). For a similar argument, see Stevenson, supra note 85, at 729. “There are 
those who predict that, as the city-state gave way to the nation-state, so the nation-state will eventually 
give way to the corporation as our principal socio-political institution.” Id. 
 169. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 104, at 65 (“[I]f due process of law is to become the way in which a 
measure of accountability is brought to the corporate enterprise, one major constitutional leap must be 
taken, namely, the concept of ‘state action’ will have to be dropped by the Supreme Court, at least in 
part.”). 
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can be overcome by recognizing both the state’s role in chartering 
corporations and the significant impact private corporations have on 
the welfare of individuals. 
First, corporations would not exist without the state’s approbation. 
There is little doubt that the drafters of our Constitution would not 
instantly recognize this fundamental reality. As Adolf Berle wryly 
observes: 
Had the question come up, let us say, in 1800, when there were 
only 300 recorded corporations in the United States, all of which 
derived their authority from the states or predecessor colonies, 
the lawyer arguing that they were purely private and, because 
private, not within the scope of constitutional limitations on 
governmental action would have had the difficult side of the 
argument.170 
Even today, “[t]he fact that the state benefits from granting corporate 
charters, combined with the corporation’s dependence on state-
granted limited liability (and other unique benefits of corporate 
status), suggests a symbiotic relationship between the state and the 
private corporation that is relevant to state action doctrine analysis 
under current precedents.”171 
It is difficult to deny the basic premise that corporations “are 
created by the State as a means of furthering the public welfare.”172 
As such, “[t]he private practice of a corporation (or apparently any 
aggregate body) taken under or in furtherance of a privilege granted 
                                                                                                                 
 170. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity—Protection of Personal 
Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 945 (1952). 
 171. Padfield, supra note 116, at 726. As Padfield elaborates: 
First, the corporation does not exist without the State and the State derives significant 
benefits in exchange for granting corporate status . . . . Second, the abuse of the corporate 
form for illegitimate governing is foreseeable and has been predicted since the 1800s, but 
state law nevertheless encourages this type of abuse by making shareholder wealth 
maximization the priority of corporate management and protecting those managers from 
personal liability via doctrines such as the business judgment rule . . . . Third, the 
democratic process has arguably failed to keep the accumulation of corporate power in 
check and therefore it falls to the judiciary to rein in the abuse of that power. 
Id. at 703 (emphasis omitted). 
 172. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 818 (1978) (White, J., dissenting). 
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by the state falls within the area of constitutional control.”173 In sum, 
one response to the lack of state action critique is “that the 
corporation, itself a creation of the state, is as subject to 
constitutional limitations which limit action as is the state itself.”174 
Second, and beyond the debates about whether the outsourcing of 
government functions renders state action doctrine problematic,175 
large corporations control resources that often exceed those of the 
governments that created them.176 Thus, they affect the welfare of 
individuals in a manner that rivals, and might even surpass, that of 
government. As Erwin Chemerinsky observes, “the concentration of 
wealth and power in private hands, for example, in large 
corporations, makes the effect of private actions in certain cases 
virtually indistinguishable from the impact of governmental 
conduct.”177 As another scholar asks: 
If the sovereign state of Delaware is subject to the limitations of 
the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment, then why should not the 
“corporate state” of DuPont or General Motors? By applying the 
Constitution to such entities—by “constitutionalizing” the 
supercorporation—it may be possible to retain the benefits 
flowing from the private ownership of business while 
simultaneously attaining a higher degree of fairness in the social 
                                                                                                                 
 173. Berle, supra note 170, at 951; see also id. at 952 (“Implicitly, it would seem, state action in 
granting a corporate charter assumes that the corporation will not exercise its power (granted in theory at 
least to forward a state purpose) in a manner forbidden the state itself.”). 
 174. Id. at 942. As Russell Stevenson observes: 
Although it is a point often lost sight of, corporations are the recipients of a grant of 
important privileges and rather substantial powers from the state, and it seems not at all 
unreasonable to suggest that those powers and privileges ought to be used in the public 
interest and, to that end, that their exercise might properly be subjected to certain 
conditions. Corporations were historically viewed as much as instrumentalities of the 
state as centers of independent private power. 
Stevenson, supra note 85, at 728. 
 175. See, e.g., Padfield, supra note 116, at 712 (“[O]utsourcing of inherently governmental functions 
via privatization is another way in which corporations can end up in governing roles.”). 
 176. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 85, at 728 (noting “a world in which large corporations control 
resources and wield powers which dwarf those of state governments, and indeed, in the case of the 
largest corporations, the governments of all but a handful of nations”). 
 177. Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 510–11 (1985); see also 
Krannich, supra note 21, at 100 (“Modern business corporations have the capacity to aggregate enough 
power and influence to rival governmental institutions.”). 
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order.178 
After all, “[t]he power of many large corporations over the lives of 
their employees, the residents of the communities in which they 
operate, and even their customers, often surpasses in practical impact 
that of the state governments to whose laws corporations nominally 
owe their existence.”179 As Adolf Berle elegantly argued in the 
1950s: 
The thrust of the doctrine here propounded is precisely that 
where the corporation by reason of size or of degree of 
concentration has acquired power giving it the capacity to 
impede personality or personal life it has become, [tanto 
quanto], an arm of the state both because it is a state chartered 
corporation and because it is relied on by the community as a 
necessary part of its economic function.180 
In the tradition of Berle, Reich laments that while “[p]ublic 
government is limited in what it can do to individuals by the 
provisions of the Constitution; private government is subject to no 
such limitations.”181 But the situation is actually far worse than what 
Reich describes: not only are private corporations not subject to 
constitutional restraints, they are using the Constitution both as an 
                                                                                                                 
 178. Miller, supra note 104, at 65. Other scholars echo these concerns: 
Viewed in the large, the proposition that the government of the state of Arizona or the 
City Council of Keokuk, Iowa, are subject in all respects to the restraints of that 
formidable body of constitutional law known as “due process”—which comprehends 
among other things most of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights—but that the General 
Motors Corporation or American Telephone and Telegraph are not, appears on its face 
rather absurd. Surely the influence wielded by one of these corporate behemoths over the 
lives and fortunes of its employees is at least as great as the impact of most state and local 
governments on the daily affairs of their citizens. 
Stevenson, supra note 85, at 732. 
 179. Stevenson, supra note 85, at 729. Cf. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 809 
(1978) (White, J., dissenting) (“It has long been recognized however, that the special status of 
corporations has placed them in a position to control vast amounts of economic power which may, if not 
regulated, dominate not only the economy but also the very heart of our democracy, the electoral 
process.”). 
 180. Berle, supra note 163, at 658. 
 181. REICH, supra note 29, at 30. 
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offensive weapon against government regulation and in the service of 
managerial capitalism.182 
By contrast, individuals might be better off with a jurisprudence 
that asks whether corporate actions pass constitutional muster. As 
Berle forcefully notes: 
It is here submitted that a corporation or concentrate of 
corporations, so situated that it has power seriously to affect the 
individual life of a patron or customer, has become an arm of the 
state so that its actions are reviewable to determine whether or 
not they accord with the constitutional limitations and 
requirements imposed on states.183 
The great irony here is that constitutional law might do what business 
law has not done well: regulate corporations in a manner that 
enhances public welfare.184 While there is at least some doctrinal 
support to rethink the state action doctrine,185 such reform is 
admittedly a very long haul. The crucial insight is to recognize that 
corporations may more closely be analogized to governments than to 
persons; after all, “[h]ad jurists focused on economic power, the 
analogy of a corporation to a government might have forcefully 
suggested itself.”186 
                                                                                                                 
 182. See supra Part II.A. 
 183. Berle, supra note 163, at 657. Reich makes a similar argument: 
The Constitution and the Bill of Rights should be made applicable to economic or private 
government and to the workplace. Corporations should lose their special status as 
“persons” and their ability to dominate the political process and the channels of 
communication . . . . These changes would recognize the need to bring private economic 
power under the Constitution and thus ultimately under the control of the American 
people. 
REICH, supra note 29, at 195. 
 184. As Reich laments, “Every form of legal control over the corporation has failed. Control by the 
stockholders—the supposed owners of corporations—was lost to management. . . . A second kind of 
legal control—the antitrust laws—also failed.” REICH, supra note 29, at 34–35. 
 185. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (“[T]he circumstance that the property 
rights to the premises where the deprivation of liberty, here involved, took place, were held by others 
than the public, is not sufficient to justify the State’s permitting a corporation to govern a community of 
citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties.”). Cf. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 184 (1961) 
(Douglas, J., concurring) (“A license to establish a restaurant is a license to establish a public facility 
and necessarily imports, in law, equality of use for all members of the public.”). 
 186. Mark, supra note 19, at 1446; see also Bezanson, supra note 26, at 656 (“Indeed, the size and 
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Specific reforms can follow. For instance, Erwin Chemerinsky has 
suggested that “states could be required in chartering corporations or 
granting licenses to insist that the private entity refrain from 
infringing constitutional liberties”187 and Russell Stevenson envisions 
a “Corporate Bill of Responsibilities”188 which would “at a 
minimum, comprehend some guarantee of free speech, a prohibition 
of invasions of individual privacy, and something akin to ‘due 
process’ rights for employees and perhaps others.”189 
Beyond suggestions for reform that should be debated, one should 
not lose sight of the big picture. When thinking about whether our 
jurisprudence has been evolving in precisely the wrong direction, it 
might be worth revisiting Victor Brudney’s prescient warning thirty 
years ago: 
Regardless of whether increased corporate participation in the 
social and political life of the nation is desirable as a matter of 
policy, serious doubts exist regarding the validity of the 
constitutional support thus given to that movement. That support 
could significantly reduce the regulatory power of government 
over an institution whose existence is uniquely a function of 
government authorization, whose power and wealth often far 
exceed those of the government that created it, and that has long 
been a subject of pervasive government regulation.190 
To the extent that the issues raised by thinkers as varied as Reich, 
Berle and Brudney are cause for concern, it might behoove us to 
                                                                                                                 
power of corporations would more likely lead to the conclusion that corporations are a sector in need of 
popular control rather than in need of actively participating in political discourse.”). 
 187. Chemerinsky, supra note 177, at 527. 
 188. Stevenson, supra note 85, at 732. Much like Reich, Stevenson recognizes: 
[T]he corporation as an institution possessing the power to intrude on important social 
values, inherent in such a document, would explode the myth with which we have so long 
been saddled that our society is sufficiently atomistic that the only concentration of 
political and social power against which we must be on our guard is that which resides in 
the state. 
Id. at 733 (footnote omitted). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Brudney, supra note 126, at 236 (emphasis added). 
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begin asking not whether corporations should have constitutional 
rights, but whether to evolve a mechanism that protects individual 
rights in the face of corporate power.191 
CONCLUSION 
One might reasonably argue that conceptualizing corporations is 
not trivial. After all, “the large corporation [does] not fit well into a 
legal system designed to mediate conflicts between individuals and 
between individuals and government.”192 Notwithstanding this 
reality, offering constitutional protections to corporations is nothing 
short of breathtaking. As Carl Mayer observes: 
Behind doctrines of commercial property and the free market 
of ideas is hidden the tacit acceptance of the corporation as a 
person, entitled to all the rights of real humans. Under this 
methodology of constitutional operationalism, the rationale for 
equating corporations and persons is not stated specifically, 
however, so it cannot be rebutted. There is no opportunity for 
denial; sub silentio the corporation is legitimated as a 
constitutional actor.193 
Especially troubling is the fact that legitimization has occurred 
without a consistent theory of the corporation.194 
                                                                                                                 
 191. Cf. REICH, supra note 29, at 196 (“We must revise the social contract to reflect the central role of 
organized economic power and to define the responsibilities that accompany such power.”). 
 192. Mark, supra note 19, at 1445; see also Krannich, supra note 21, at 89–90 (“The history of 
corporate personality doctrine reflects a struggle to fit the corporate entity into traditional legal 
practices. This is no easy task, for corporations do not readily fit within the American legal tradition.”); 
Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person, supra note 72, at 1641 (“As common as its presence may 
be, the legal nature of the corporate person has defied simple analysis.”). 
 193. Mayer, supra note 12, at 650 (emphasis added). Cf. Bezanson, supra note 66, at 739 
(“Institutional speech, in contrast, is abstracted from the individual; it is an artifact. It has nothing to do 
with liberty and no necessary relationship to freedom, a term that is meaningless outside the context of 
individuals.”). 
 194. See Mayer, supra note 12, at 650–51 (“But it is certain that the conferral of corporate Bill of 
Rights protections, without any theory, has served an important legitimizing function. Extending these 
rights has legitimized corporations as constitutional actors and placed them on a level with humans in 
terms of Bill of Rights safeguards.”). 
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One also cannot help but wonder to what extent a zero-sum game 
is at work: greater constitutional protections for corporations come at 
the expense of individual rights. As one commentator observes, one 
must recognize “not only that legal personhood relates to actual 
social status, but also that status may operate as a zero-sum game; 
grants of legal personality to corporations may cheapen the social 
meaning of humans’ legal personality”195—after all, “[c]alling 
corporations persons sends a message about the state’s values: by 
implicitly extending human dignity to artificial business entities, the 
state cheapens the distinctiveness of legal personhood by 
overextending its application.”196 As just one example, one might ask 
whether over-expansive First Amendment rights for corporations 
might trammel the due process rights of voters under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, or perhaps even the rights of shareholders 
to remain silent under the First Amendment.197 
Sadly, “[t]he corporation’s invocation of the first ten amendments 
symbolizes the transformation of our constitutional system from one 
of individual freedoms to one of organizational prerogatives.”198 By 
contrast, reviving the artificial entity theory might return us to what 
scholars such as Morton Horwitz have described as “‘methodological 
individualism,’ that is, the view that the only real starting point for 
                                                                                                                 
 195. Legal Fiction, supra note 2, at 1764. 
 196. Id. at 1765; see also Padfield, supra note 116, at 707 (“[T]here can be little doubt that the power 
of multinational corporations is growing. It seems reasonable to conclude that this gain in power must 
come at the expense of a loss of power on the part of other parties.”); Rivard, supra note 12, at 1431 
(“One problem noted by commentators is the increasing protection corporations enjoy under the Bill of 
Rights, which expands the power of corporations at the expense of individuals.”). 
 197. See also Mayer, supra note 12, at 658 (“Fourth [A]mendment rights applied to the corporation 
diminish the individual’s right to live in an unpolluted world or to enjoy privacy. The corporate exercise 
of first amendment rights frustrates the individual’s right to participate equally in democratic elections, 
to pay reasonable utility rates, and to live in a toxin-free environment.”). In the words of one scholar: 
When Mobil Oil Corporation purchases an advertisement that promotes a particular 
social view, the real speaker is again top management. Should not Congress have the 
power to deny top management access to the corporate treasury based on an equal-
footing rationale? Management could spend its own personal funds or solicit, individually 
or collectively, contributions from others to further their expression. This congressional 
action would not prevent the actual expression, but would only place all individuals at the 
same starting point. 
O’Kelley, supra note 26, at 1382. 
 198. Mayer, supra note 12, at 578. Cf. Alvarez, supra note 157, at 35 (“We should never confuse the 
economic rights of corporations (or of investors) for the rights of natural persons to live in dignity.”). 
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political or legal theory is the individual.”199 Perhaps what is needed, 
as some have suggested, is a constitutional amendment that 
corporations, as creatures of the legislature, only enjoy rights 
conferred to them by their creator.200 The broader point, however, is 
that “[t]he State need not permit its own creation to consume it.”201 
Amid all this pessimism, let me conclude on a hopeful note: 
institutions such as corporations can only survive and thrive if we as 
a polity validate them.202 Let us not forget that while “[m]onarchies 
may legitimize themselves by reference to the divine right of 
kings . . . in a society founded on democratic values legitimacy 
ultimately depends on responsibility and accountability.”203 If more 
of us stop acquiescing and begin asking for “responsibility and 
accountability,” then perhaps one day our constitutional 
jurisprudence will again be different.204 We need more people like 
the brave child in Hans-Christian Andersen’s strikingly 
contemporary tale about the naked emperor. 
                                                                                                                 
 199. Horwitz, supra note 11, at 181. Cf. REICH, supra note 29, at 199–200 (“We need to restore 
citizenship by returning to the ideal of democratic individualism . . . . In a society where organization 
possesses so much power to change individual behavior, individuals must be much more conscious of 
their species and evolutionary role, so that we can guide our own changes rather than submit to being 
changed by impersonal forces.”). 
 200. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 12, at 660 (“What is required is a constitutional presumption 
favoring the individual over the corporation. To establish this presumption, a constitutional amendment 
is needed that declares corporations are not persons and that they are only entitled to statutory protection 
conferred by legislatures and referendums.”). 
 201. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 809 (1978) (White, J., dissenting); see also 
C.F. Adams, Jr., A Chapter of Erie, in CHAPTERS OF ERIE AND OTHER ESSAYS 1, 95–96 (1871) 
(“Modern society has created a class of artificial beings who bid fair soon to be the masters of their 
creator.”); Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person, supra note 72, at 1658 (“Loosen the fiction 
theory from its absolutist moorings and we find a bare, political message: society should not lose control 
over that which it creates.”). 
 202. See Backer, supra note 153, at 45 (“A corporation cannot exist as a viable entity in the absence 
of either legal or social ‘validation.’”). 
 203. Stevenson, supra note 85, at 714. 
 204. Cf. Backer, supra note 153, at 1 (“It was once a comfortable tenet of law that economic 
enterprises organized in[ ]corporate form were the creatures of the states that recognized and regulated 
their existence.”). 
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